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Introduction
As the light rose over the horizon for the second time that morning in 1945, the scientists
at Los Alamos celebrated their achievement as the world entered the nuclear age.1 The United
States held on to its nuclear secrets in the beginning, but soon the information and technology
spread to the Soviet Union and beyond. Nuclear technology became a desirable symbol of
power around the world and countries went to great lengths to acquire it. As a former colonial
hold of Great Britain, Pakistan wanted to cement its status as the most influential Muslim nation
in the world by acquiring an atomic weapon. During his administration, President Jimmy Carter
took on the threat of Pakistani proliferation with vigor. His efforts did not dissuade Pakistan
from developing an atomic bomb, but he did warn the entire international community and was
effective in temporarily slowing Pakistan’s nuclear development program.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology became a significant concern of
President Carter during his final two years in office. As more countries requested and traded
nuclear information, the threat of nuclear proliferation grew.2 In order to fully understand the
complicated diplomatic situation between the United States and Pakistan regarding Pakistani
inquires into nuclear weapons development, it is crucial to understand previous diplomatic
interactions between the two countries and the Carter administration’s foreign policy. An
investigation of the Pakistan’s competition with India, the Carter administration’s foreign policy,
Pakistan’s longing for a nuclear weapon, and the impacts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty reveal
the complicated and potentially dangerous relationships between the United States, Pakistan, and
other nations of the world.
1

Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
“Atomic Power: The Spread of Nuclear Technology Hold Promise and Peril for Developing
World,” The Washington Post, December 3, 1978, A1.
2

4

Pakistan’s early history had a significant influence on its desire for an atomic weapon,
especially its relationship with India. The first chapter details the United States previous foreign
policy interactions with Pakistan, concentrating on interactions after Pakistan gained
independence from Great Britain in 1948 to the early years of the Carter administration.
Understanding the rivalry between Pakistan and India is crucial to understanding one of
Pakistan’s main motivations towards the development of nuclear weapons.3 Pakistani Prime
Minister Bhutto, who first began the atomic program, “claimed that before he was deposed
Pakistan was on the verge of ‘full nuclear capability.’ He pointed out in this context that only the
Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan would share the technology with
Islamic states.”4 The chapter will also examine Pakistan has experienced political instability
since its independence in 1948. The constant shifting of power between the civilian and military
leadership played a profound role in providing the United States and other countries
understandable questions about Pakistan’s intentions.
The second chapter details Carter’s foreign policy in general, his main foreign policy
advisors, and how his policies affected Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. One of the
two areas covered are Carter’s campaign promises to the American people and the foundation for
his administration’s foreign policies. For example, in one instance Carter halted aid to Pakistan
because of its failure to protect human rights, but then reestablished aid when the United States
needed Pakistan’s support after the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan.5 The chapter
introduce Carter’s top two foreign policy advisors, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National
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Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. The two advisors were important in the development of
United States foreign policy to Pakistan, but problems developed between them that weakened
Carter’s administration. The final section of the chapter details Carter’s development of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Pakistan’s reaction to the existing Non-Proliferation Treaty.
When the original Non-Proliferation Treaty was offered to the international community,
developing countries interested in acquiring nuclear power considered it racially motivated and
declined to sign.6 Carter hoped that a new treaty would bring the hold out countries together and
end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.
The final chapter evaluates the diplomatic discussions between U.S. officials and other
countries regarding the development of nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan. The chapter
begins with a focus on the discussions between the United States and France regarding France’s
sale of gas centrifuges to Pakistan and the plan to build a reprocessing plant, which caused
tensions between the two countries.7 A reprocessing plant would have given Pakistan the
capacity to produce weapons grade plutonium suitable for an atomic device. The other intention
of the chapter is to discuss the anxieties between Islamabad and Washington D.C. regarding the
Pakistani French contract and suspending Pakistan’s aid. The final section discusses the
international pressure that the United States put on its allies to limit Pakistan’s access to atomic
materials, including informing the International Atomic Energy Agency of the situation.
Most information utilized for the thesis is from the National Security Archive, which is
an archive that compiles released SECRET U.S. documents. Most of the documents released
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regarding this period of the Carter administration were released within the past two years and
cover the time period from August 1978 to January 1979, the critical time period regarding
Pakistan’s inquires into nuclear material. Among the documents are correspondences between
State Department officials, including Secretary of State Vance and Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, and American ambassadors from around the world. Most of the documents
are telegrams between the Embassies in Paris, London and Islamabad that discuss the current
situation with Pakistan and the most appropriate diplomatic responses.
The Foreign Relations of the United States is another critical source of information that
expands upon the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Pakistan. The
documents disclose the diplomatic cables from the Truman through the Ford administrations’
and are an invaluable source of information regarding diplomatic relations.

For example,

several of the early documents discuss the disintegration of the British Commonwealth and the
creation of Pakistan and India.
The other documents utilized were newspaper articles that discuss the situation in
Pakistan and American reaction to the situation. The Washington Post and The New York Times
both reported on Pakistan and the U.S. response to the current diplomatic tensions. Several of
the articles also discussed the current problems with nuclear proliferation in developing countries
and concerns that they could not properly maintain a nuclear facility. Newspaper articles also
shed light on the political climate in Pakistan and the United States in the late 1970s, and the
international reaction to nuclear issues. The newspapers also show the growing strength of the
radical Muslim movement before the takeover of the Embassy in Tehran. Some of the
information regarding nuclear issues is still classified; so, newspapers are crucial to setting the
tone of international relations.
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Another source of information regarding the Carter administration will be through the
review of memoirs from the former president, Vance, and Brzezinski. Carter served as the
president from January 20, 1977 to January 20, 1981 during a time of great political upheaval in
Pakistan.8 In his memoir and published a diary, Carter did not delve deeply into thePakistan
issue, but he did make a couple of passing comments reflecting on the situation. He also
discussed his appointment of Vance and Brzezinski and his relationship with the advisors and
their respective departments.9 Vance’s Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign
Policy offers more detail regarding Pakistan-United States relations.10 Brzezinski’s Power and
Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981 details his term and the
decisions he made during his own tenure at the White House.11 The only drawback to the
memoirs is that most of the information provided is limited because of national security issues
and each author is biased towards their own position.
Carter administration’s foreign policy shows the complicated nature that existed between
established nuclear powers and developing countries wishing to bring their countrymen into the
nuclear age. Pakistan’s wish to acquire atomic weapons was not merely to intimidate its
neighbors, but to bring an atomic weapon into the Muslim world. The proliferation of nuclear
weapons caused great concern to the international community and challenged the Carter
administration’s policies. Carter did limit Pakistan’s access to nuclear technology and materials.
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However, Pakistan did continue its search for atomic materials and successfully detonated its
first atomic device in 1998.12
In the beginning of his administration, Carter made a variety of promises regarding nonproliferation and told the American people that he wanted to bring morality back to the White
House. However, once in office, Carter faced increasing problems around the world with
American foreign policy and soon abandoned this practice in favor of a more aggressive
approach. His abrupt switch also caused conflict within his own administration and the eventual
resignation of his secretary of state. An investigation into his campaign promises shows that the
idealism spoken connected to a desire within American hearts, but Carter could not present a
comprehensive policy to the American people.
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Chapter 1 – The Foundation for Conflict
After years of research, Pakistan proudly set off an atomic bomb in 1998 and became the
first Muslim nation to join the nuclear community.13 The explosion caused tensions around the
world and further strained diplomatic relations between Pakistan and its main rival India, which
had detonated its own atomic device in 1974.14 The original Pakistani effort to build the atomic
bomb began in the 1950s and reached a fever pitch during the Jimmy Carter administration when
Pakistan made a deal with France for a reprocessing plant that could create fissionable
plutonium.1516 Pakistan’s complicated relationship with the Untied States served as a strong
example of its limited understanding of South Asia’s political and military history, and the
inability of the United States to dissuade Pakistan from developing the atomic bomb.
The people of Hindu and Muslim faiths had previously lived together in peace for
centuries under the Hindu and British Empires. At the dawn of the twentieth century, democracy
movements began to rise throughout the world and the colonies of the British Empire began to
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demand their independence.17 When free elections came to British India, it required a census of
all the people living within the colony and their religious affiliations. The Muslims were aware
of their minority status within the territory, but it was ever more evident after the census that put
to paper the inequality between the two groups.18 As the Indians moved towards majority rule,
some members of the Muslim population became increasingly paranoid that they would be
marginalized within the structure of the new independent India. Nationalism increased through
movements around the colonial territory and pro-independence Muslims created a council in
order to develop a political presence in the government.19 The beginning of this differentiation
between groups allowed for divisions to grow between the Muslims and the Hindu. Once a
united group of people living peacefully under a single leadership, the peoples of India became
increasingly divided along religious lines and desirous of separate countries.20
The establishment of a distinctly Muslim Congress Party in Indian in 1916, laid the
foundation for the creation or two separate counting India and Pakistan.21 Muslims came together
under this banner to contact the powerful Indian/Hindu Congress and originally they wanted to
work within India. However, it soon became evident that they needed their own country. T.V.
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Paul writes, "in March 1940, at its meeting in Lahore, the (Muslim) League proclaimed as its
goal the creation of Pakistan as a separate homeland for Indian Muslims and the CongressLeague schism widened even further."22 Such an arrangement meant not only national
separation, but also a political identity free from British control. The British and Indians rejected
this course, heightening tensions with the Muslim population.23
After the Second World War, Great Britain decided to dissolve its foreign colonies and
partition British India. However, the original colony lines were a single territory that included
Muslim and Hindu believers under a single political leadership. According to Historian Robert
McMahon, “The urbane barrister’s dogged insistence that Muslim rights could not be guaranteed
in a predominately Hindu India had been instrumental in forcing the Indian Congress Party
hierarchy and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last British viceroy, to accept with great reluctance a
partitioned subcontinent.”24 Muslim leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah argued that a Hindu
government would not treat its Muslim subjects fairly and persuaded British viceroy Lord
Mountbatten that the Muslim population should be given its own country.25 In accordance with
Muslim wishes, Lord Mountbatten drafted new borders and formed West and East Pakistan, as
well as the new territorial boundaries of India on August 15, 1947.26 Unfortunately, the
boundary lines made little sense because it divided Pakistan’s eastern and western portions,
located on either side of India, a thousand miles apart (see map 1). The division of the territories
was also not confirmed by the 500 princely states of India, which meant that there were still
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several disputes over the lines of India and Pakistan.27 The decision to dissolve the colonial
territories of British India caused confusion and laid the foundation for the problems between
India and Pakistan over the coming decades.

Map 1 – Southwest Asia28
Governing East Pakistan was troublesome because of communication difficulties.29
McMahon explains, “Pakistan faced an equally daunting set of structural and political
challenges, most of which stemmed from the unusual circumstances surrounding its creation.
Essentially, the Muslim League’s insistence on an independent state for India’s Muslims led to a
country carved out of the northwestern and northeastern sections of British India, areas with no
appreciable industrial infrastructure.”30 The other significant problem was that the partition did
not determine who had the right to claim Kashmir, a territory to the northeast of Pakistan with a
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Hindu leader but a mostly Muslim population.31 Tensions between India and Pakistan began to
intensify as each country sought Kashmir in order to help secure its own borders.32 Pakistan
truly believed that it was incomplete without the inclusion of Kashmir, since it was a mostly
Muslim country.33
The conflict was rooted in the development of nationalist movements in the Indian
subcontinent. The main Hindu party wanted to create a government with a secular leadership,
and a liberal democracy, but the Muslims worried that this would eventually develop into a
Hindu government. The British supported the creation of a Muslim delegation that had limited
electoral power.34 According to the Muslim leader Jinnah, the Muslims could not accept a
British Raj being replaced with a Hindu Raj. The United States Charge of Affairs in India
George Merrell explained that Jinnah believed “the difference in culture, religion, and way of life
between the Muslims and Hindus precludes any possibility of a compromise. He asked why a
hundred million Muslims should become a minority in a Hindu dominated government."35
Jinnah went on to state that if any Muslim did not join the independence movement, they would
be considered traitors of Islam.36
When Pakistan gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, it did so in an
environment of high tensions with India, and the two countries entered a conflict within a year.37
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There is no singular event that caused feelings of animosities between the two religious groups.
However, violence has sporadically erupted and Hindus have attacked Muslims and Muslims
have attacked Hindus through history. McMahon notes, "Sadly, independence and partition also
brought in their wake a human tragedy of grotesque proportions. Deep-seated religious and
communal tensions and fears, exacerbated by the irresponsible rhetoric of demagogic politicians
and the arbitrariness of the boundary lines drawn by the British, led to an orgy of bloodletting,
especially in the Punjab.”38 Great Britain’s inadequate and rushed creation of the two countries
showed a profound lack of substantive understanding of the history of South Asia, and led to the
first conflict over Kashmir and Pakistan’s constant feeling of inadequacy.
The U.S. reaction to the creation of Pakistan and its conflict with Kashmir were decidedly
mixed. Before Great Britain determined that there would be two separate states of Hindus and
Muslims, the United States was aware of several discussions about whether or not Pakistan
would be part of India. While not directly influencing the situation, the United States became
increasingly concerned that the unstable situation might lead to violence similar to what
happened during China’s Communist revolution.39 When the conflict later developed in
Kashmir, the United States wished for a settlement quickly as U.S. officials knew that the
situation could extend into a full-scale war.40 At this point the United States did not have a
vested interest in either country since its concern was in war-ravaged Europe.41
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The conflict over Kashmir seemed slight in comparison with the rest of the world’s
problems, but its impact reverberated throughout Pakistan’s history and profoundly affected
diplomatic relations with the United States and India.42 Great Britain’s creation of India and
Pakistan did not include ceding Kashmir since the Maharajah, or leader of the region could not
decide which country that he wanted to align himself. As a Hindu leader with a mostly Muslim
population, Pakistan seemed the obvious choice; however, the Maharajah’s indecision seemed to
mean that he would move towards India.43 The disagreement over Kashmir worried American
leadership and had a profound impact on future Pakistan, Indian, and U.S. relations.44
President Harry Truman inherited several international problems in the aftermath of the
Second World War and the disintegration of Britain’s colonial empire confounded the
international situation. The partition of Pakistan and India did not come as a shock to the
administration and Truman sent a brief congratulatory note to both countries in celebration of
their independence.45 Truman wrote, “On this auspicious day which marks the emergence
among the family of nations of the new Dominion of Pakistan, I extend on behalf of the
American people sincere best wishes to you, and through you, to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali
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Khan and the people of Pakistan.”46 Another press release stated that the United States would
immediately set up an embassy in Karachi, Pakistan and would appoint Charles W. Lewis as the
first ambassador.47 When it came to developing foreign relations, the United States first leaned
toward India as its primary country of interest, since India had more natural resources.48 The
United States recognized Muslim political and economic aspirations, "but that atmosphere for
creating necessary safeguards can never be achieved unless the concept of union itself is
generally accepted by principal parties."49 However, after the Kashmir dispute dragged on and
India seemed to treat the Soviet Union and China equally with Western powers, the United States
became increasingly frustrated with India, and moved closer to Pakistan.50 India also angered the
United States when they began to give Truman unsolicited advice on America’s war in Korea.51
The increasing friction between India and Truman’s administration caused frustrations and
concerns over the future of South Asia.
In order to combat the possible loss of Kashmir, a group of ten thousand tribesmen from
Pakistan invaded the north country in order to force the Maharajah to pick Pakistan as its
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country.52 When the Muslim tribesmen invaded, the Maharajah’s army lowered its arms and
joined their Muslim brothers. Pakistan’s military supported the involvement of the tribesmen
until military commanders received reports from the front lines of looting and rape.53 In a
desperate attempt to regain control over the situation, the Pakistani military tried to reassert itself
over the tribesmen.54 Pakistan’s efforts were for naught when the Maharajah ceded the territory
to India and the Indian army defeated the Pakistani tribesmen. Although the conflict was never
considered a war, Pakistan lost the territory of Kashmir to India and thus a considerable amount
of power in the region. The loss also encouraged a massive military build up in Pakistan and
compromised any future attempt at democracy because the military felt that its control over the
decisions of Pakistan was critical.55
The Pakistani military has always been a powerful presence within the country and any
civilian leader faced significant problems controlling the military apparatus. As a former colony
of the British Empire, Pakistan maintained a strong military structure even after the transfer of
power in 1947. Nawaz explains, "the Pakistan Army, the largely Muslim rump of the British
Indian Army too was saddled at birth with this paradoxical identity: the symbols of Islam but the
substance of a colonial force, quite distant from the body politic of the fledgling state.” 56
History in Pakistan has shown that civilian power will arise for a period of time, but the military
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will stage a coup d’état at some point in order to gain control over the country again.57
Understanding the dominate role of the military in Pakistan’s early history is crucial to
understanding its development of the atomic bomb and Pakistan’s relationship with the United
States.58
During the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pakistan became
increasingly close to the United States and an active participant in the Cold War. Pakistan
allowed the Central Intelligence Agency to fly U2 planes on spy missions over the Soviet Union
from bases in its territory.59 CIA officials were looking for “atomic energy installations along
the Trans-Siberian Railway and a large downrange radar array that was a terminal site for missile
firings from Kapustin Yar.”60 Conversations between the two countries allowed for the
cementing of the relationship and led to the use of Pakistani land to support American
intelligence interests in the Soviet Union.61 In September 8, 1954, Eisenhower worked to create
the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty, more commonly known as the Manila Pact,
which included Pakistan, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the United States.
The purpose of the pact was protecting against possible Communist aggression in the region. In
the event of an attack on one country, the others recognized it would endanger the peace and
safety of other pact countries.62
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Early in his presidency, Eisenhower sent Vice-President Richard Nixon on a tour around
South Asia in order to assure allies that the United States was concerned about their needs.63
Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower was conscientious of the need to keep relations between
India, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan balanced, and he would often schedule tours that would
visit all three countries in order to keep the equilibrium. Eisenhower explains, “it would be
almost unthinkable for an American President to make a courtesy call on India without including
Pakistan in his itinerary. Both nations were our friends each looked to the United States for
private and public investment, and each, because of their mutual distrust heightened by
differences over Kashmir, was watchful of every acquisition by the other of military supplies - or
any other relative advantage.”64 As a president, Eisenhower made sure that the relationship
between Pakistan and the United States remained similar with its neighboring Muslim countries.
His balanced relationship with Pakistan was probably one of the most stable periods in the
relations between Pakistan and the United States.
The Kashmir conflict flared again in 1965 as Pakistan renewed its claim to the territory.
President Lyndon Johnson reflected in his memoirs that the conflict “raised grave doubts about
military assistance as well as economic aid” that the United States had given to Pakistan.65 The
other large problem facing the United States was the lack of a grain surplus. Previously, the
United States had the ability to send economic aid in the way of grain to countries in need, but
since the amount of grain produced in the United States had decreased since the 1940s, Congress
looked at foreign aid with critical eyes.66 The lack of support from the international community
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increased the tensions in Washington D.C. regarding supportive aid to Pakistan. The Kashmir
conflict of 1965 also worried the United States and the Johnson administration because Pakistan
was using U.S. weapons in the conflict.67
One large disruption in Pakistani relations with the United States happened during
military talks in 1965 and eventually resulted in massive anti-American demonstrations in the
Asian nation.68 Before the collapse of the United States and Pakistan negotiations, there were
steady trilateral talks that occurred between India, Pakistan, and the United States regarding
weapon deals.69 During the Kennedy Administration, Pakistan became increasingly frustrated
with the United States when it made an economic and military aid deal with India. H.W. Brands
explains, “After Kennedy initiated military aid to India, the Pakistanis didn’t have to bother
equating bread and bullets, since India now received both from Washington, (So did Pakistan,
but far less bread and, before long, fewer bullets too).”70 The Johnson administration attempted
to provide equal aid to Pakistan and India. However, information later leaked that the United
States and India had reached a secret agreement, which angered the Pakistanis. The United States
determined that India would receive $10 million of credit for military weaponry in 1965 and
promised of $50 million more in the next fiscal year. Pakistani reaction to the pact was swift,
explosive, and emotional, and anti-American demonstrations were common. Pakistan leader
Ayub Khan stated that, “Americans do not hesitate to let down their friends.”71 What the
Pakistanis chose to ignore was that the conflict began with Pakistani soldiers entering the
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Kashmir disguised as mujahedeen. Knowing this, the Untied States felt this was an aggressive
action that did not fall under the provisions of SEATO.72
The United States admitted several faults in the relationships between the two countries
before the war began.73 Some of the diplomatic blunders committed by the United States
included the cancellation of a trip to Washington D.C. Khan, and finally, Pakistan was frustrated
that the United States did not come to its defense when India committed aggressive actions in
1965.74 A previous deal between the United States and Pakistan stated that any military deal
with India would be discussed with the South Asian country so Pakistan believed it had been
betrayed by the United States. Evidence shows that relations between the two countries became
considerably strained because the United States perpetuated Pakistani beliefs that the U.S.
government did not support Pakistan or a Muslim government.
The United States further angered Pakistan when it demanded that the Pakistani’s not use
U.S. weaponry in the civil war with East Pakistan and India in 1971. The weaponry included
tanks, rifles, airplanes, and other war material.75 India did receive some of her weaponry from
the United States, but some of her military materials also came from the Soviet Union and other
countries; so, the U.S. restrictions on weapons use did not affect the country much.76 The United
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States seemingly biased position against Pakistan was detrimental in the war of 1965 and later
civil war, and played a key role in Pakistan’s belief that the United States did not support her
Muslim allies.77
Pakistan’s largest crisis was the civil war that began in 1971 between East and West
Pakistan, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. The civil war proved to be disruptive to
the country in several ways and began with East Pakistan’s quest for greater autonomy and the
growing divisiveness between the Western Pakistan’s Punjabis and East Pakistan’s Benglis.78 A
slow reaction to a cyclone that killed over two hundred thousand East Pakistanis also played a
crucial role in the belief that the West Pakistani government was ineffective and unsupportive of
the East.79
An election in 1970 was the water shed moment when Western and Eastern Pakistan
relations began to break down. The election resulted in a loss for the Western Pakistani
government in East Pakistan in favor of the Bengalis. Current Pakistan leader Mohammad
Yahya decided to reject those election results.80 The contention soon resulted in conflict as West
Pakistani forces moved in “with stunning brutality” to crush the rebellion.81 Steve Weissman and
Herbert Krosney reports, “They had burned Bengali villages, raped Bengali women, killed and
mutilated unarmed Bengali men.”82 The Western Pakistan forces also began a cleansing process
of arresting intellectuals, students, spiritual leaders, and separatist leaders, including Sheik
Mujibur. The government also outlawed the Awami League, which had just won the first free
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election in the territory and held its leaders for execution.83 One million people became
casualties and ten million refugees from East Pakistan sought refuge in India.
East Pakistan’s quest for liberation drew support from India. In December 1971, Western
Pakistani forces launched an air attack against India and turned the civil war into a full-scale
conflict with its neighbor.84 Pakistan lost this war with India as well which further perpetuated
its feeling of inferiority to its South Asia neighbor. The United States was less than pleased
with the action, especially when Pakistan called upon America to honor the Manila Pact, even
though Pakistan was the aggressor when they invaded Kashmir.85
The Nixon administration had perhaps the closest relationship to Pakistan, and it played a
crucial role in the United States relationship with China. At the time, Pakistan was the only
country in the world that was allied with both China and the United States.86 Nixon sent
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on a mission through Pakistan to China in order to reestablish
diplomatic relations and make preparations for President Nixon’s historic visit to Peking.87 In
order to fly to China and begin the process of reconciliation, Kissinger feigned digestive distress
and with the knowledge of a small amount of American and Pakistani officials, flew to China.88
Nixon recalls, “On October 25 (1972) President Yahya Khan of Pakistan came to see (Nixon),
and I used the occasion to establish the ‘Yahya channel.’ We had discussed the idea in general
terms when I saw him on my visit to Pakistan in July 1969. Now I told him that we had decided
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to try to normalize our relationship with China, and I asked for his help as an intermediary.”89
During the civil war in Pakistan, India had called upon the Soviet Union to support its
intervention and to humiliate Pakistan over the loss of Bangladesh.90 Nixon also ordered that
diplomats side with Pakistan over India in order to avoid the forced dismantlement of West
Pakistan and “to demonstrate to China that we supported our strategic partners in times of
crisis.”91 The civil war in Pakistan occurred during the period of reconciliation between the
United States and China, and the Nixon administration wanted to demonstrate that the United
States would support its allies during a crisis period.
The U.S. reconnection with China also played a crucial role in the war between India and
Pakistan during the Pakistani Civil War. After the Sino-American relationship was reestablished
between 1973-1978, the Soviet Union determined that it needed to reestablish its position as the
dominant Communist power in the world; so, it offered military aid to India. In order to limit
possible Chinese involvement in the war, the Soviet Union moved troops to the Chinese border
to prevent them from aiding the Pakistanis.92 According to President Nixon, the United States
took the position as a supporter of Pakistan in order to discourage “Indian aggression and Soviet
adventurism.”93 But as the conflict wore on it became increasingly evident that West Pakistan
would lose its Eastern half and Nixon recommended to Yayha Khan that West Pakistan move its
forces out of the East and in order to protect it from Indian aggression.94 The United States had
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discovered that India was planning an invasion of West Pakistan, a worst-case scenario for the
United States considering all the potential casualties.95
West Pakistan’s civil war with East Pakistan garnered international attention and caused
further tension between Pakistan and India. In a review of the conflict, the Pakistani military
determined that the West’s defeat was based mostly on its slow reaction to the developing crisis
and its inability to effectively communicate with its forces in East Pakistan.96 After the war,
Bangladesh considered itself a client state of India and the two continue to have a strong
relationship.97 When it came to negotiating the deal with India and Bangladesh, Pakistan was at a
distinct disadvantage and the new Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto waited to finalize
the treaty because he did not want to incur domestic disfavor by dealing with the enemy.98 After
losing Bangladesh, the army took the defeat harshly and continued to increase its size.99
When Bhutto came to the United Nations Security Council in order to discuss the current
situation with East and West Pakistan, he stated that he wanted to mend relations with the United
States. Special Assistant to Bhutto, Rafi Raza, explains, "He placated the United States by
expressing sorrow for 'strained relations' in the past: 'I am prepared to do everything in my power
to repair those relations in Asia for the United States and in my country where...I speak in my
right as the authentic voice of the people...The time will come. We cannot forget it.'"100
Bhutto’s recognition of the importance of United States and Pakistan relations shows the value of
95

Ibid.
Nawaz, Crossed Swords, 311.
97
Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, 40.
98
"Wrapping Up the War," Time 102:12 (September 17, 1973), 52.
99
"In the process, Pakistan's security threat from India grew, forcing it to meet India's rapid
growth of military might on the one hand, and on the other the appearance of the Soviet armed
forces in Afghanistan to its west in the 1980s further propelled its expansion." Nawaz, Crossed
Swords, xxxvii.
100
Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977 (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1998), 126.
96

26

U.S. support in the civil war.
Towards the end of the war, Pakistan attempted to acquire more weapons from the United
States. However, Nixon did not have the ability to provide the weapons Pakistan requested
because of previous embargo on foreign military sales was still in effect. Nixon attempted to
circumvent this by telling CIA officials to arrange for Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia to supply
Pakistan with the weapons.101 Despite his efforts, the request was denied and Pakistan quickly
agreed to a cease-fire. President Nixon did attempt to help the Pakistan’s against the foreign aid
laws of the United States, but the Pakistani governments did not readily recognize his clandestine
approaches.102
Bhutto came to power as a national hero and a popular opposition leader against the
previous government after the civil war in 1971, but his heavy-handed approach to leadership
and his handling of the election in 1976 severely affected the length of his tenure.103 The best
description of Bhutto is that he was “a charismatic, brilliant, flamboyant, but deeply flawed
politician.”104 Henry Kissinger also described Bhutto as “a man of extraordinary abilities whose
ruthlessness was matched by his brilliance.”105 Kissinger goes on to discuss how Bhutto’s
destroyed his own authority by calling for a popular election before manipulating the result.106
Bhutto intensified Pakistan’s efforts to gain atomic power to counter India’s
advancements in nuclear technology. But, the main reason why Pakistan wanted the atomic
bomb was because she wanted to enter into the prestigious nuclear club. The ability for a
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country to advance into a nuclear power meant that it had emerged from a Third World status.107
Bhutto’s former press secretary Khalid Hasan said, "He wanted the bomb, you know, because he
wanted Pakistan to walk tall. He knew that proliferation will come, and that more countries will
become nuclear, and that there's nothing that can stop it. So, if everybody's going to have a
bomb in the basement, he said, 'Okay, if we have the capability, let's do it.'"108
In order to have effective diplomacy in South Asia, the United States had to maintain
relationships with both Pakistan and India without offending either country. India’s problem with
U.S. policy did not rest only on the selling of weapons to Pakistan, but India’s belief that
Pakistan would use any acquired weapons for aggressive actions.109 According to the U.S.
Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, “American officials know full well why Pakistan wants
these (nuclear weapons)…Pakistan has openly said its arms build-up is aimed against India.”110
Regardless of beliefs to the contrary, the competitive nature of India and Pakistan has caused
constant tension between the two countries and if either acquired military weapons or a military
contract with a foreign country, the other one would make a formal complaint in the international
community.111 Some of the weapons the United States considered selling to the Pakistani’s in
1970 included 6 replacement F-104 fighter-interceptors, 300 armored personnel carriers, and 4
anti-submarine patrol aircraft. Other weapons options included 7 B-57 bombers and 100 M48.112
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The Indian government specifically warned about a possible backlash against the U.S.
government if word of the diplomatic exchanges became public knowledge.113 In order to voice
their grievances, the Indians even publicized their criticisms of the United States in order to
cause an over reaction within their own media.114 According to William Spengler, the Country
Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan, “on October 8, 1970, the Indians issued a press statement
announcing their protest and indicating that they were not satisfied with U.S. explanations for the
sale. The statement alleged that our decision was against the interest of peace in South Asia. It
said "the resumption of inflow of arms" to Pakistan, which has committed aggression against
India three times, is of grave concern; Pakistan is armed only against India.”115 Every action of
the United States towards Pakistan was interpreted by India as a possible aggressive action
unless it was favorable towards India’s viewpoint.
India’s concern over the military developments in Pakistan spilled into Indian and U.S.
relations and began to negatively affect American diplomacy with India. In one particularly
tense occasion, Indira Gandhi told the U.S. news show, “Meet the Press,” that the sale of
weapons to Pakistan would harden India’s attitude towards the United States.116 The Indian
press in particular seized upon this negative situation regarding the selling of U.S. weapons to
Pakistan and exploited it at home.117 Other diplomatic failures like the accidental non-appearance
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of an ambassador at the airport to greet Mrs. Gandhi and the failure of President Jimmy Carter to
accept Mrs. Gandhi’s dinner invitation served as examples of the tense Indo/U.S. relations.118
The actions by the U.S. government were not deliberate, but the Indian press seized upon the
subtle message in order to confirm their anti-American beliefs.
The other diplomatic problem that the United States had was keeping a steady
relationship with Pakistan while maintaining a relationship with India and avoiding a possible
Pakistan-Soviet or Pakistan-Sino alliance.119 Cold War sentiments were still a basic part of U.S.
foreign policy and avoiding a communist leaning Pakistan meant maintaining strong diplomatic
connections. The fear of Pakistan developing a close relationship with China or the Soviet
Union kept the United States engaged in talks to avoid an unfavorable situation.120 In previous
talks with the Johnson and Nixon administrations, Pakistan had been promised weapons and
materials that they never received.121 The consistent promise of weapons between U.S.
presidential administrations to the Pakistanis also caused tensions with India. However, U.S.
policy officials believed a disgruntled India was okay if it prevented a Pakistani/China/USSR
alliance.122 Regardless of America’s willingness to deal in atomic material, Pakistan wanted a
weapon in order to represent its power international community.
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For a country like Pakistan, the prospect showing off an atomic bomb appealed to their
inferiority complex with India and allowed them to cement their position as a world power. An
atomic test would only confirm its power in the world and was at the core of Pakistan’s efforts to
achieve a nuclear weapon. 123 S.P. Seth explains, “Bhutto’s promise that Pakistan will have a
‘bomb’ even if its people have to eat grass neatly summed up this determination.”124 The
Pakistan quest to achieve the atomic bomb was based in a desire to achieve the ability to stand
tall with Western powers and to achieve the first atomic bomb in the Islamic world. Dr. A. Q.
Khan claimed, “If Pakistan had such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim
world.” He added, ‘All the Western countries, including Israel, are not only Pakistan’s enemies
but also enemies of Islam…All this is part of the Crusades which the Christians and Jews
initiated against the Muslims 1,000 years ago.”125 Pakistan, therefore, not only symbolizes the
aspirations of the entire Islamic world, but also makes a strong claim to its leadership
The formation of British India into two separate countries laid the foundations for
the conflicts between Pakistan and India during the twentieth century. Encounters over
Kashmir, civil war with East Pakistan, and a military coup d’état in the 1970s in Pakistan
escalated tensions between the two South Asian countries and challenged diplomatic
relations with the United States. The successful Indian detonation of an atomic bomb and
Pakistan’s nuclear quest all eventually contributed to a difficult presidency for incoming
President Carter.
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Chapter 2 – The Carter Question
On the day of his inauguration in 1977, Jimmy Carter faced the American people with
excitement, a powerful vision, and hope for the future. The last several years had been filled
with scandal and the violent uprisings of the 1960s, and the new president sensed the fatigue and
hope of the American people. "The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit,” the President
said in his Inaugural Address. “Peoples more numerous and more politically aware are craving
and now demanding their place in the sun—not just for the benefit of their own physical
condition, but for basic human rights.”126 Carter came to the presidency with limited experience,
but he brought a new passion to the White House and a desire to reestablish America’s role as
the world’s most righteous government.127
Carter had been governor of Georgia in the early 1970s, but his ultimate goal was to
become the president of the United States.128 As a candidate with state governance experience
only, Carter had a significant disadvantage against the Republican candidate President Gerald
Ford.129 Known more as a businessman than a politician, Carter seemed an odd choice as the
Democratic Party’s nominee for president.130 Leslie Gelb of The New York Times argued that
Carter had great potential as president, but his view of America’s foreign relations remained
relatively unknown.

Despite his limited foreign policy experience, Carter received a

nomination to the Trilateral Council, an organization dedicated to furthering relations between
Western Europe, America, and Japan. Carter first met Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Trilateral
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Commission, which became a key advisor to Carter on his foreign policy.131 Brzezinski later
noted Carter began his candidacy with only 2% recognition from the general population when
the he signed on to support the candidate.132 Carter’s utilized Brzezinski’s in regards to foreign
policy, and promised the American people a change in American diplomacy around the world.
Although the future president presented vague notions, it never resulted in an explicit plan to the
American people and thus unexpected changes developed over time.133
During his campaign, one of Carter’s greatest strengths was his ability to gather support
as the anti-establishment candidate. Following the scandal of Watergate and Nixon’s
resignation, Carter seemed an exciting alternative to the establishment members of Washington
politics. John Herbers of the New York Times reported, “Nevertheless, Watergate, like the Great
Depression of the 1930s and the Vietnam War, became implanted in the national psyche, as a
unique event that raised basic questions about the American government.”134 Carter represented
a change from a presidential administration that had made the public previously question the
integrity of the government.135
The other large focus of Carter’s foreign policy during his campaign was to be the
antithesis to the Nixon/Ford/Kissinger administrations. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s
seemingly heavy handed and secretive approach in foreign policy gave him the nicknames the
“Lone Ranger” and “a one-man policy of international adventure,” and a reputation for
131
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“excessive secrecy in foreign affairs.”136 If elected president, Carter promised that his
administration would include more conferences and summits to discuss important policy issues
at all levels.137 He also wanted to rejuvenate partnerships with several U.S. allies in Western
Europe, the Americas, and Japan.138 He also campaigned on the belief that the United States
should include other democracies in foreign policy decisions.139 Although Carter wanted to
model his administration differently, he still wanted to keep several of Ford/Kissinger’s policies
on détente and opposed Congress interfering with the United States economic relations with
Moscow.140
Carter focused on America’s position in the world, human rights, deemphasizing the Cold
War, and morality during his campaign.141 Carter hoped that his foreign policy would encourage
a “more active participation by other democracies in the resolution of international problems.”142
David Skidmore explains, “The notion that the U.S. faced new limits on American power abroad
spread widely through academic and foreign policy circles during the seventies.”143 He added,
“America’s failure in Vietnam was only partly responsible for these perceptions. The rise of the
Soviet Union to military parity with the U.S., the economic revival of Europe and Japan, as well
as the growth in the number of newly independent and increasingly nationalistic Third World
countries all played a role in reinforcing the belief that the U.S. must adapt its policies to reflect
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new global circumstances.”144 During Carter’s campaign, he stated, “the United States should
not ‘become militarily involved in the national affairs of another nation’ nor back a leader who
uses ‘repressive force against his own people.’”145
In reaction to the Vietnam War, Carter campaigned on the promise to avoid the mistakes
of the previous administration. The president stated, “We will not behave in foreign places so as
to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation
earns is essential to our strength.”146 He did not adhere to the earlier administration’s standards
of trying to impose American style constitutional democracies around the world while ignoring
the human rights violations of those countries.147 For example, the Nixon administration
maintained strong ties with South Korea and Chile despite of their appalling human rights
records.148 Charles Mohr of the New York Times reported, “Mr. Carter said some regimes, such
as South Korea and Chile, ‘openly violate human rights’ and that the United States should not
‘condone repercussions’ but should use ‘our tremendous influence to increase freedom,
particularly, in those countries that depend on us for their very survival.’”149 After winning the
election, Carter went further to explain that the U.S. perception of another country would “shape
our own people’s attitude toward that nation’s government.”150
Carter’s election as president came as a reaction against an era of government mistrust
and secretive administrations that left many Americans disenchanted with their own
144
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government.151 Former President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger embodied the
characteristics that Carter campaigned against and the feeling of government suspicion that
inundated the country, especially in regards to foreign policy. Kevin Mattson explains, “The past
kept torturing the present with memories. The failure in Vietnam, the fears and conspiracies
nurtured by Watergate, the assassinations and violence in the 1960s – all these things pressed in
on the nation’s psyche during the decade.”152
After he successfully campaigned for President, the vagueness of Carter’s foreign policy
campaign promises began to create tensions on Embassy row, the area of Washington D.C.
where most of the foreign embassy offices are located. His questionable position on American
relations with other countries raised several questions within the international community about
how they would be treated by the new president. New York Times author Bernard Gwertzman
explained, “Jimmy Carter’s victory has already caused a problem for virtually every foreign
embassy here. Whether it liked the Ford Administration’s policy toward its government or not,
at least each embassy knew what it was and had grown accustomed to it.”153 Carter did not help
his situation by refusing to meet with several foreign ambassadors before taking office and his
notably off-hand approach throughout his entire presidency offended several ambassadors.154
In his Inaugural Address, Carter noted that, “The world is still engaged in a massive
armaments race designed to ensure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries.
We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's armaments to those
151
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necessary for each nation's own domestic safety. And we will move this year a step toward
ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.”155 Morality and the arms
race were unavoidability tied together for President Carter, and he spent most of his presidency
trying to change the world towards his goal of ridding it of weapons of mass destruction.
Carter believed emphasizing human rights would bring the government together. Carter
later reflected, “judging from news articles and direct communications from the American
people to me during the first few months of my administration, human rights had become the
central theme of our foreign policy in the minds of the press and public.”156 The progress
towards human rights did have broad support from the American public, but Carter had a limited
impact on the atrocities of the genocide in Cambodia and apartheid in South Africa. “But the
victims who survived and who had enough freedom to speak out applauded the American policy
and believed that conditions would have been far worse had the United States remained
silent.”157 Carter’s human rights initiative did have some impact on the international community,
but it remained a confusing and disjointed effort until the end of his administration.158
Morality was also the central focus of his administration because the new president
thought it would be easier to unite the country around ideals that had been lacking due to the
scandals of the early 1970s.159 Carter also tied his moral views to the arms race.160 Hedrich
Smith reported that for Carter, “this meant not just reducing the number of strategic nuclear
weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union, but also curbing conventional arms
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sales to Third World nations and preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology."161 Carter
was not only interested in the moralism of atomic weaponry, but he was also interested in
reestablishing the moral authority of American citizens. In Reversing Course, Skidmore argues
that overemphasis on moralism does not completely explain Carter’s foreign policy decisions,
since he was both a liberal policy maker and an idealist. Skidmore further explains, “Carter’s
moralistic embrace of human rights was motivated not only by his own intense moral convictions
but also by the belief that these sorts of appeals would bolster his own political fortunes and win
support for his foreign policy reforms.”162 Carter believed that the proliferation of nuclear
weapons threatened the future of the world.163 In a message to Congress, Carter argued “…if
our (nuclear) policy is too weak, we could find ourselves powerless to restrain a deadly
worldwide expansion of nuclear explosive capability.”164
The untested and unclear nature of Carter’s foreign policy was apparent before he took
office, but his managerial style also affected the way he dealt with foreign issues. 165 Carter’s
background as an engineer taught him a different approach to management and problem solving,
which affected his ability to give a comprehensive foreign policy. When any foreign crisis came
to his attention, Carter handled the problem as its own separate situation and did not include
broader context in his evaluations. He had vague notions like human rights, arms control, and
peace in the Middle East, but there was never any long term goal or structure given to the
American people that they could readily understand and follow in the media. Scott Kaufman
161
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explains, “Maybe most important, he saw himself as someone whose job it was to solve
individual problems rather than to give the American people a vision of where he planned to take
the country. The American public thus saw, more often than not, contradictory and inconsistent
policies. If Carter had a better grasp of both the possible and of Washington politics, his foreign
policy record might have proven more successful."166 There were also some instances in which a
policy Carter strongly believed in failed, like when talks regarding SALT II fell through and the
failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
One other signature of Carter’s managerial style was his tendency to try to acquire all the
necessary information from his advisors and provide a plan of action that the cabinet would be
responsible for executing. His Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, recalls, “He listened carefully
and wanted the fullest discussion before making decisions. He was, if anything, willing to
permit debate to go on too long and to try and absorb every detail and nuance before making his
decision.”167 This style had mixed results because the president had to rely on others in order to
implement his policy, and they would often bring their own interpretations into the equation.168
Kaufman states, “He tended to stitch together alternatives rather than make choices, which
caused confusion as to what his policies were. Instead of taking time to vet policies before trying
to implement them, he sought to enact many initiatives at once. As a result, policies interfered
with one another or had to be so revised that they became inconsistent in their
implementation.”169 The difficultly with the president trying to dictate all aspects of his policy
caused increasing problems within the administration.
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In order to create the feeling of a shared partnership and equality among the government
departments, Carter attempted to craft a system where all of the White House staff members had
equal access to the President.170 Jean Garrison explains, “Carter’s open, spokes-in-the-wheel
system was organized to produce a collegial system in which the president was in the center of
the wheel of information and advice. In reality the president often left the policy details to his
advisory group.”171 White House advisor Jody Powell explained, Carter designated his White
House in a spokes and wheels approach in order to “make sure that no one or two people will be
able to cut him [Carter] off from dissenting opinions.”172 Carter’s spokes-in-the-wheels
approach lacked effectiveness because not every member of his cabinet had easy access to him,
and it did not limit fighting within the bureaucracy. Those staff members with offices in the
White House had significantly more access to the president than other groups.

For example,

Brzezinski’s office as National Security Advisor was located within the White House, while
Secretary of State Vance’s office was located within the State Department building. Further, his
constant traveling also kept him away from the White House.173 In comparison, Brzezinski
stopped by the Oval Office so often for a quick chat with Carter that the staff stopped recording
their meetings due to the frequency.174 The unevenness between the national security advisor
and the secretary of state meant that one group achieved its goals more than the other.
Carter also had a different interpretation of his role as president than his predecessors,
and this change dictated how he governed and how he interacted with congressional leaders.
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Charles O. Jones explains that, "President Carter interpreted his representational role as that of
the trustee - an official entrusted to represent the public or national interest, downplaying shortterm electoral considerations."175 Being a trustee president also meant that he felt that it was his
responsibility to determine what the policies would be, and he tended to look down upon
congressional leaders. Kaufman states, "Carter did do a poor job of confronting governmental
infighting, and he did see himself as a trustee of the American people, which caused problems
with Congress.”176 His inability to compromise and work with congressional leaders made
implementing his policies more difficult as his presidential tenure continued. He also did not
develop a strong relationship with his own party member, which also contributed to problems
with gathering support for his policies.
Carter’s foreign policy suffered in the transition from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
to Cyrus Vance. When Vance was first announced as the secretary of state, he did have a brief
meeting with Kissinger on foreign policy issues, but several international ambassadors were
nervous about the transfer of power.177 The majority of the embassies in Washington D.C. raised
questions about Carter’s administration because Kissinger’s departure caused great change
without a concrete foreign policy being set in place by the new government.178 According to
Bernard Gwertzman of The New York Times, “even his detractors [Kissinger’s] are saying that
with his flair for the dramatic, his demanding criteria for excellence, and his ability to appoint
good men to important jobs, he has left a mark on Foggy Bottom that will never be erased.”179
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Each embassy knew its place within Kissinger’s sphere of influence. Kissinger was extremely
clear to foreign ambassadors about what their position was to the U.S. government and how they
would be treated.
In order to create a strong foreign policy team, Carter appointed several individuals who
had significantly more foreign affairs experience. Secretary of State Vance was a successful
attorney with Foreign Service experience.180 Carter described Vance as, “cool under pressure, he
had also served as special troubleshooter for more than one President when there were crises in
Cyprus, Korea, and Vietnam. Cy was very knowledgeable in both military matters and foreign
affairs.”181 Carter reflects that Vance’s experience in law as a trial lawyer and his position on the
Preparedness Investigation Committee, contributed to the decision for his appointment. Started
during in the 1950s, the Preparedness Investigation Committee became a powerful voice for
defense issues and studied into missile and satellite weapons.182 His former appointments as
Secretary of the Army and deputy defense secretary under Lyndon Johnson also made him a
strong addition to Carter’s administration. Vance became a partner on the development of the
more idealistic impulses of Carter’s diplomacy. However, the president and Vance did not have
a close personal relationship, and they were no more than acquaintances throughout Vance’s
tenure as Secretary of State.183

180

Carter, Keeping Faith, 52.
Ibid., 50.
182
“Committee Resource Guide: Committees of the U.S. Senate,” A Brief History of the
Committee: The Russell Era, 1955-1968, http://www.archives.gov/legislative/findingaids/reference/senate/armed-services/1955-1968.html
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/finding-aids/reference/senate/armed-services/19551968.html, (accessed on March 27, 2012).
183
Vance eventually resigned his position as Secretary of State in 1980 over Carter’s handling of
the Iranian hostage situation. Carter accepted his resignation and did not attempt to talk him out
of it. Carter, White House Diary, 420.
181

42

Betty Glad, a political scientist from South Carolina, explains that Vance was, “an able
and experienced diplomat, dedicated to the task of fulfilling Carter’s more idealistic goals.”184
When Carter and Vance first came together to discuss foreign policy issues, they agreed on most
issues and both sought a more balanced relationship with the Soviet Union. Vance recalls,
“Carter shared my belief that we should continue to work for a reduction in tensions with the
Soviet Union, while vigorously defending our global interests and maintaining an unquestioned
military balance.”185 Carter described his own view of the Secretary of State, “my own
preference was that one of the roles of the Secretary of State be the education of the American
public about foreign policy.”186 President Carter’s view on the leader of the Department of State
fit perfectly with what Vance brought to the administration.
When he accepted his position as Secretary of State, Vance made one request of the new
president. He wanted the responsibility for defining the administration’s foreign policy to fall to
Carter and himself. As Carter lost wide support from the national and international community,
Brzezinski inserted himself more and more into the decision making process causing tension
within the White House.187 Vance explains, “it also became a political liability, leaving the
Congress and foreign governments with the impression that the administration did not know its
own mind. I warned the president of this danger and the confusion it was causing.”188
Vance represented Carter’s more idealistic notions of a closer relationship with the Soviet
Union and the growth of human equality around the world. He strongly believed that the United
States could create friendlier diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which could limit
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military expansion in both countries. He also believed that the United States had a limited
amount of power, which restricted its ability to intervene in conflicts around the world, an
observation similar to Carter’s.189 During his campaign, Carter told the American people that the
United States had to come to terms with the rise of other democracies and leaders around the
world that might challenge the United States.190 Carter explained, “we must learn to live with
diversity and to cooperate’ as long as such parties and leaders respect the democratic processes,
uphold existing international commitments and are not subservient to external political
direction.”191
Vance came to the White House with similar ideals and thoughts on the direction that
American foreign policy should take during the Carter administration. He later reflected, “Carter
shared my belief that we should continue to work for a reduction in tensions with the Soviet
Union, while vigorously defending our global interests and maintaining an unquestioned military
balance.”192 The other aspect of Soviet relations that Carter and Vance wanted to conclude was
the new SALT agreement in order to limit the spread of nuclear technology into Third World
countries.193 Vance also strongly argued that the Third World should be given the proper
attention from the international community, instead of the focus being focused on the East-West
divisions of the Cold War.194 Vance recalls, “Carter shared my feeling that we should redefine
and give higher priority to nuclear proliferation, international arms transfers, human rights, and
international economic development and cooperation.”195
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To fill the position as his National Security Advisor, Carter chose Brzezinski. Considered
a controversial choice at the time, Brzezinski was brilliant and informed, but his personal style
had the potential to cause tensions within the administration. A professor at Columbia
University and a prolific author on the Soviet Union, Brzezinski soon became the backbone of
the administration. The new national security advisor also brought many young men from New
England to the new administration, in the hopes that they could bring new perspectives to the
government and American foreign relations. 196 Carter claimed the National Security Council and
Advisor; “Zbig was a first-rate thinker, very competent in his choice of staff members and able
to work harmoniously with them (I do not remember any dissension at all).”197
Brzezinski had a decidedly aggressive view towards the Soviet Union and came to
represent Carter’s more forceful policy. 198 Carter described Brzezinski as “astute in his
analyses, particularly knowledgeable about broad historical trends affecting the industrialized
nations, and a firm believer in a strong defense for our country and in the enhancement of
freedom and democratic principles both here and abroad.”199 In contrast to Vance, Brzezinski did
not support any type of pro-Soviet initiatives and constantly struggled with Vance over foreign
policy.200 According to Betty Glad, Brzezinski viewed “the Soviet Union as a megalomaniac
state bent on world domination, and he viewed U.S. military power and the threat that it might
actually be utilized as one of the most important factors in shaping Soviet policies.”201
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When making his final decision for national security advisor, most of Carter’s advisors
welcomed the suggestion with a few reservations. Several individuals told Carter, “Dr.
Brzezinski might not be adequately deferential to a secretary of state.”202 This actually served to
Carter’s greater purpose as president, as he wanted “the final decisions on basic foreign policy
would be made by me in the Oval Office, and not in the State Department.”203 Brzezinski’s
aggressive stance as that national security advisor came from his anti-Soviet policies, and
ultimately he used his leverage to gain control over the foreign policy of the United States.
Carter’s description of the State Department bureaucracy was decisively different than
his rather favorable view of the smaller and more selective National Security Council. He
explains the State Department was, “a sprawling Washington and worldwide bureaucracy, with
compartmentalized regional and national desks” and he “rarely received innovative ideas from its
staff members about how to modify existing policy in order to meet changing conditions.”204 In
contrast to Carter’s positive view of the National Security team under Brzezinski as a smaller,
more contained unit. Carter explains, “Brzezinski and his relatively small group of experts were
not handicapped by the inertia of a tenured bureaucracy or the responsibility for implementing
policies after they were evolved. They were particularly adept at incisive analyses of strategic
concepts, and were prolific in the production of new ideas, which they were always eager to
present to me.”205 The opinions Carter had on the two departments laid the foundation for future
problems. Kaufman explains, "Yet Carter never effectively reconciled the approaches of his
secretary of state and NSC adviser, resulting in a policy that was inconsistent, incoherent, and
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even contradictory.”206 The limitations that Carter put on the State Department in his own mind
permitted a fracture within the administration’s spokes-in-the-wheel approach.
In the creation of his administration policies, Carter initially relied on Vance to inform
the American public and international community regarding the decisions of the administration.
As the administration continued to suffer problems, Brzezinski became the voice of the
administration by 1980. Brzezinski reflected, “His reluctance to speak up publicly, to provide a
broad conceptual explanation for what our Administration was trying to do, and Carter’s lack of
preparation for doing it himself, pushed me to the forefront. (I will not claim I resisted strongly.)
That in turn fueled resentments, if not initially on Cy’s part, then clearly so on the part of his
subordinates.”207 Carter also notes, “Brzezinski was always ready and willing to explain our
position on international matters, analyze a basic strategic interrelationship, or comment on a
current event.”208 The development of Carter’s collegial environment began to suffer increasing
organizational problems when Brzezinski overshadowed Vance as the voice of the
administration.
Vance and Brzezinski did have problems between their different perspectives on foreign
policy and the natural competition between their departments, but their personal relationship
remained intact. Brzezinski reflects, “I must say [Vance] is really a very pleasant person to deal
with. It would be difficult to imagine someone better as Secretary of State in terms of the
personal relationship, even though I am often frustrated by what the Department of State stands
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for. There is no doubt he is a very good person-extremely loyal, highly dedicated, and willing to
do what the President wishes without too much questioning.”209
When the international situation began to deteriorate, and Carter’s poll numbers dropped
the president began to look towards Brzezinski.210 Glad explains, “A hardline Cold Warrior at
heart, Brzezinski used his superior access and ability to frame issues, control agendas, and find
allies to move Carter in the direction Brzezinski desired.”211 He also became a close friend with
the president and the two would often spend time together outside the White House. Carter
reflects in his memoirs that, “Zbig had been my primary foreign affairs advisor during my
presidential campaign and continued in this role as national security advisor. He and I were in
close contact throughout each day and had an excellent personal relationship.”212 He went on to
discuss how, next to his family members, “Zbig would be my favorite seatmate on a long
distance trip; we might argue, but I would never be bored.”213 Brzezinski became the dominant
force in the administration.
Carter’s position on foreign affairs weakened in the late 1970s, as he dealt with several
international crises that challenged American power and influence abroad. The Iranian
Revolution that began in 1978 and resulted in Islamic fundamentalists seizing the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran in November 1979 and taking of 50 hostages.214 Then in December 1979, the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan. The situation in the Middle East deteriorated further with the
storming of the holy site of Mecca by Muslim extremists in 1979. False reporting in Pakistan that
Americans led the attack on the holiest site of Islam resulted in the storming of U.S. Embassy in
209
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Pakistan.215 As Carter dealt with each of these situations, problems within his own
administration became more apparent and led to American disillusionment with his policies.
In the beginning, Carter relied more heavily on Vance over Brzezinski in regards to
policy; however, as criticism of his foreign policy increased after the takeover of the U.S.
Embassy in Iran, Carter turned to Brzezinski in order to gain more public support.216 For
example, Vance was a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and he thought
that the Soviets would more readily agree to the treaty because it had an ending date within five
years of its implementation.217 Glad explains, “But Cyrus Vance found his way blocked by a
national security advisor who employed all the tactics noted in the management literature to
move Carter in an anti-Soviet direction.” 218 Vance also believed in continuing of the U.S.
prohibition of trading uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities and
technologies.219 Brzezinski’s opposition to the treaty contributed to its eventual demise and is an
example of the increased difficulties between Carter’s two top foreign policy advisors.
It became evident even during his early years as president that his policy on human rights
would also experience problems. In one instance, Carter supported Soviet dissidents because he
felt that it was their human right to protest against their government, and he immediately angered
the Kremlin.220 The policy on human rights became inconsistent because even when the U.S.
government chastised a government for human rights violations, American corporations would
continue to funnel money into the government in order to fulfill contracts.221 In certain
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situations, Carter was also willing to abandon his moral policies in order to save face or protect
American interests.222 For instance, the damage that Carter’s position on human rights caused
meant that any nuclear negotiations were tainted with pessimism by non-nuclear countries.223
For example, Carter’s interference with the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in their
efforts to acquire atomic weapons caused problems in diplomatic relations. All three country’s
were chastised by the U.S. government for human rights violations.
While Carter did bring change to the White House, he also had a difficult time
implementing his foreign policy. He committed several diplomatic gaffes during his
administration, and he failed to sway his Middle Eastern and Indian allies to follow his policy
decisions. For example, during a Middle East tour in 1978, he failed to get King Hussein of
Jordon to join him for peace negotiations in Cairo or Indian Prime Minister Desai to agree to his
nuclear goals of using the atom for peaceful purposes by allowing the International Atomic
Energy Agency to inspect all nuclear weapons and materials. 224 Also, Carter was caught telling
Secretary Cyrus Vance that he wanted to send a terse and cold letter to India regarding American
concerns with their nuclear program.225 This statement circulated through the international press
and negatively affected Carter’s image. Perhaps moving the Middle East countries in line with
his policies was unlikely since India’s relationship with Pakistan inhibited any possibility that a
deal would be possible. The rivalry between Pakistan and India was escalated by India’s
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acquisition of a nuclear bomb, and Carter did not understand that it was unlikely to give up the
nuclear power it had acquired.
In comparison, Carter’s broad and undefined foreign policy alienated several foreign
officials before he officially took office. When asked what his foreign policy would entail, he
told diplomats that it would be similar to Kissinger’s and changes would be minimal. However,
Carter also discussed the importance he would place on elevating human rights issues around the
world, which eventually created problems with the international community. For example,
Carter’s administration asked the Brazilian government to forgo their nuclear reprocessing aims
and torturing its dissidents, but since most Brazilian citizens did not experience their
government’s violence, they did not understand America’s stance.226 Carter’s decision to keep
most aspects of Kissinger’s foreign policy did help alleviate the transition between the
administrations, but the choice to emphasize human rights did put unnecessary strains on
relations with U.S. allies.
Carter also had difficulty conveying his ideas and beliefs to the American people.
Andrew Katz argues that Carter was unable to gain popular support for any of his foreign policy
decisions because he misinterpreted the nature of a post-Vietnam War public opinion.227 Katz
continues, “One key problem for Carter was that presidential leadership of public opinion had
become problematic owning to the breakdown of elite consensus on foreign policy and greater
public awareness of foreign policy issues.”228 The American public could no longer be
convinced of a president’s position on his word alone, as it had become pessimistic and
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untrusting of political leadership.229 In one particular speech from the Oval Office in April 1979,
he essentially told the American people that they needed to find alternative sources of energy and
limit oil consumption because of an oil crisis.230 Carter’s falling poll numbers and his difficulty
swaying Americans towards his ideas limited his ability to convince the American public that his
nuclear views were viable.
One of Carter’s main concerns, nuclear proliferation, did not become a primary focus of
the United States in the Southeast Asian region until India detonated its atomic devise in 1974.231
India began research into atomic power soon after it gained independence. However, the country
needed help in order to get the atomic program running and turned to the United States. It signed
thirty-year agreement with the United States in 1959 to build two nuclear reactors in India to
provide power fuel.232 When the United States submitted the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to
the world in 1968, India refused to sign the agreement stating that the treaty violated its
sovereignty. Instead, India used the technology given to them by the United States to create and
detonate an atomic devise.233 The American agreement with India for nuclear power caused
tensions with Pakistan and further fueled Pakistan’s quest for its own nuclear weapon.234
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Although it happened before Carter’s time in office, the impacts of the non-proliferation directly
impacted Garter’s negotiations concerning of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
One of Carter’s early goals was to extend arms control and increase the power of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to Hedrick Smith, “The President...has an almost
“theological belief” in arms control.”235 This strong belief in limiting the expansion of arms to
non-nuclear countries became the focus of his administration with Pakistan and its fledgling
nuclear program being one of the most important. He also wished to limit China’s ability to
spread nuclear information to the rest of the world. At the time, China was clandestinely feeding
information to Pakistan, which was contrary to his policy of ending the spread of nuclear
weapons and information.236
In order to combat the weaknesses of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Carter’s
administration began to create a new treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Carter first discussed it during his presidential campaign and described as a five-year deal to halt
all nuclear explosions and to continue limits on the proliferation of weapons.237 The end result
was the development Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which included guidelines for nuclear
testing and limited test explosions. Several countries had refused to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and Carter hoped that the new treaty would bring the international community together in
agreement on nuclear issues.238 According to State Department officials, “We believe that states,
which accept a CTBT, will have less incentive to develop nuclear weapons. For example, to
acquire the full "prestige" of possessing nuclear weapons, a state would need to demonstrate its
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capability with a nuclear test.”239 The influence of the nuclear prestige factor on Indian and
Pakistan laid the foundation for the development of atomic weapons. Possessing a nuclear
weapon could move a country away from the stigma of poverty and into the twentieth century.
The memo goes on to explain, “In addition, states motivated by national security concerns
would encounter substantial uncertainties in perfecting their untested nuclear devices or
designing more sophisticated weapons without testing.”240
The hope for the CTBT was to create an agreement that could be signed by NonProliferation Treaty countries in order to help limit the spread proliferation. The CTBT became
Carter’s answer to the lingering doubts regarding the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the
international community. The problem with the previously created Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty was the feeling among Third World countries that the treaty was designed to favor
Western countries. Kaufman explains, "Nonetheless, as in the case of human rights, the
president never seemed able to come to grips with implementing the nuclear nonproliferation
initiative. Indeed, as in the case of human rights, he found he could not compartmentalize
policies; rather, he had to compromise one initiative in the name of another. Such became
apparent in U.S. nonproliferation policy toward South Asia."241
Kaufman continues, “In general, the inability to test would reduce the advantages of
acquiring nuclear weapons and would therefore diminish the incentive to undertake a weapons
development program."242 For example, India, Israel, and Pakistan did not sign the NonProliferation Treaty because they believed the treaty violated their sovereignty and there was
also a belief that the treaty put developing countries at a disadvantage to established nuclear
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nations.243 India specifically objectified to the treaty because it allowed Western countries to
detonate weapons for stockpile maintenance but not for weapons development, which is what
India needed in order to complete its program.244 The CTBT also served to extend Carter’s
strong beliefs in non-proliferation that he proclaimed during his campaign. The administration
claimed, "By demonstrating the willingness of the nuclear powers to accept restraints on their
own nuclear capabilities Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would put the U.S. in a stronger
position to carry out our non-proliferation strategy. We could better press key non-nuclear states
to accept restrictions on their activities."245
The successful test of an Indian nuclear weapon in 1974 alarmed Pakistan and turned its
attention from nuclear energy to the quest for an atomic bomb that could compete with India’s.
Pakistan’s quest for nuclear energy began in 1965 when it negotiated a deal with Canada to
create a “heavy water reactor, the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).”246 Pakistan was at
a distinct disadvantage with India in the race for an atomic bomb because it lacked the capacity
to reprocess the nuclear waste from the reactor.247 Pakistan had to reach an agreement with
another nuclear power to turn its irradiated uranium into weapons grade plutonium. The United
States wished to limit Pakistan’s ability to create a weapon and imposed harsh economic
sanctions in 1978; so, Pakistan looked to other, more favorable governments, for a deal. France
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eventually did brokered a deal with Pakistan in order to create a reprocessing facility; however,
American pressure forced it to abandon the project.248
Carter was particularly uneven in his handling of Pakistan and India because in most
situations he leaned favorably towards India, in spite of its weapons program. Kaufman writes,
“Strategically, Carter determined that close relations with India were more vital to the protection
of U.S. interests in the region than ties with Pakistan.”249 Kaufman also argues that during his
tenure as president, Carter’s inclination towards India could be attributed to his own fascination
with India since his mother spent time in the country as a member of the Peace Corps.250 Carter
also supported the recent return to democracy and fair elections in India after the previous Prime
Minister, Indira Gandhi, declared a two-year state emergency and did not allow elections.
Pakistan was relatively stable under the leadership of General Zia, but his regime was brutal and
free government elections were not held during his ten-year rule.
Carter also had significant problems with India in terms on the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since the country did not want to limit its nuclear
expansion. In a memo detailing the benefits of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, "Indian
adherence to a CTB (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) would formalize Desai's (the Prime
Minister of India) promise not to explode any more nuclear devices and extend this pledge
beyond his term in office; only within the context of a comprehensive and non-discriminatory
treaty would we expect India to adhere to a CTB."251 Carter hoped that getting India to agree to
the CTBT would influence Pakistan’s desire to acquire an atomic devise. In another memo,
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“Prime Minister Desai has indicated India is likely to agree to an adequate CTB, which would at
least temporarily obligate India to refrain from further nuclear tests. In addition, a CTB and a
successful conclusion of SALT II are two of Desai's conditions for acceptance of full-scope
safeguards on India's nuclear facilities. While we cannot predict the final Indian decision, a
limited duration CTB would clearly be more likely to influence the Indians than no treaty at
all."252
Carter’s shelved several of his initiatives as he began to move towards a more hardline,
Soviet centric policy in the latter half of his administration.253 The Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty was one of several initiatives that hit a dead end in favor of trying to contain the Soviet
threat after the invasion Afghanistan.254 The policy also failed because of opposition from
“Congress, the Pentagon, and the Energy Department to any proposal that might indefinitely
suspend nuclear testing.”255 Carter’s efforts to limiting the testing and acquisition of atomic
weapons received some positive reviews, but the policy was a failure in the reality of the
international climate of Soviet pressure and proliferation.
In order to help determine what U.S. aid would be given abroad, the Glenn Amendment
became the standard document to determine what countries would be eligible for aid. Originally
called the Symington Amendment, the Congress renamed the amendment for its strongest
supporter, former astronaut and then Senator John Glenn; the Glenn Amendment stated that no
aid could be given to a country actively seeking nuclear technology or a country that abused
human rights.256 “The Symington [Glenn] Amendment,” the NSA noted in June 1977. “Requires
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us to terminate economic and military assistance if Pakistan receives reprocessing equipment,
material or technology.”257
Brzezinski explains, "Seeking to bolster its position in and around the Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf, Carter sought to restore ties with the government of Muhammad Zia-ulHaq. Citing human rights violations by Islamabad as well as Pakistan's apparent effort to
develop nuclear weapons, the Carter administration in 1977 had suspended economic aid to
Pakistan, and withdrawn an offer to sell A-7 fighter jets to that nation.”258 After reviewing
Pakistan’s economic and military situation, Carter decided to reestablish aid to Pakistan, but in a
later review he decided to rescind his promise of monetary aid only to reestablish support after
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This backwards and forwards approach showed the
Pakistanis that the United States was an unstable ally that would give and take monetary aid
quickly without much concern for the Pakistanis. Carter only decided to aid Pakistan when the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the U.S. government used Pakistan in order to help
smuggle weapons and supplies to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan.259
President Carter began his presidency with a belief in a new world order, free from the
fear of an atomic attack and based in strong moral leadership from the United States. The
development of this ideal world did not come to fruition despite valiant efforts. Carter
campaigned on his belief in the limitations of atomic weapons and the CTBT showed his
dedication to the mission and his desire to include all countries including Pakistan. The failure
of the treaty was due to a variety of factors, but Carter’s push for a potentially unpopular treaty
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shows his dedication. Although he was not entirely successful with his goals and agenda, his
passion impacted America as he tried to lead it to a future without atomic weaponry.

59

Chapter 3 – Pakistan, A Nuclear Country
The proliferation of nuclear weapons was an international trend that President Jimmy
Carter sought to end during his presidency. When it became clear that Pakistan had devoted
itself to the acquisition of nuclear materials with the ultimate goal of building an atomic weapon,
the Carter administration began the difficult task of trying to rein in a country that believed
nuclear weapons meant security. A contract between France and Pakistan to build a nuclear
reprocessing facility, a plant that could take spent nuclear fuel rods and turn them into weapons
grade plutonium, became a great concern to the international community and especially the
United States.260 In order to try and contain the threat, the United States began an international
campaign to limit Pakistan’s access to nuclear materials. Messages and briefings between the
U.S. government and her allies abroad showed great concern regarding a nuclear Pakistan and
reveal the variety of steps the international community took to slow down the South Asian
country. The international interaction also shows the failure of the Carter administration to halt
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and demonstrates that Carter’s policies had minimal affects on a
country dedicated to the development of a nuclear weapon.
Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s greatest goal while in office was to
develop an atomic weapon for Pakistan and he began his efforts soon after he came to power in
1971.261 Pakistan had a strong history of scientific endeavors, which laid the groundwork for
Bhutto’s atomic quest.262 In January 1972, Bhutto hastily called together fifty of Pakistan’s top
scientists and government officials for what was to be a secret meeting to discuss the country’s
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nuclear options.263 Pakistan’s nuclear program began to intensify after 1974 as a reaction to
India’s detonation of an atomic devise. In order to justify its ambitions to the international
community, Pakistan argued publically that its need for security against India and the prestige of
being a nuclear country justified its actions. The United States believed that Pakistan’s
motivation in its quest for nuclear weapons was the prestige factor, which would allow it to
move beyond its Third World status.264 However, other reports suggested that the country was
more strongly influenced by its belief that India threatened its national security.265 With several
conflicts occurring between 1949-1971, Pakistan felt constantly threated by its Hindu neighbor
and hoped that by developing its own atomic device the countries would again be equal rivals.
The unpublicized reason Pakistan wanted an atomic weapon was to cement itself as a
powerful member of the Muslim community.266 This was probably the most troubling to the
Carter administration since it had no reasoning other than to promote antagonism with nonMuslim countries, specifically Israel and India, and to eventually spread nuclear technology to
unstable Middle Eastern countries.267 Before he was disposed, Pakistani Prime Bhutto also
supported the Muslim theory as he claimed that Pakistan was close to becoming a nuclear state
and “he pointed out that only the Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan
would share the technology with Islamic states.”268 He also stated that Pakistan would “eat
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grass” in order to acquire a nuclear weapon.269 Bhutto’s successor, General Zia, explained his
country’s Muslim outlook in an interview in July 1978. Zia stated, “No Muslim country has any
(atomic arms). If Pakistan possesses such a weapon it would reinforce the power of the Muslim
world.”270 The United States considered this comment to be a political gaffe for Zia and found
all these statements disquieting.271
In the mid-1960s, Pakistan placed an order with Canada to build a nuclear power plant
that would largely financed by the Muslim world.272 At the time, the Canadians were actively
looking for nuclear export orders and the facility would eventually supply some 137 million
watts of electricity for the Pakistanis.273 They built the civilian standard Candu natural uranium
reactor at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant [KANUPP] in February 1974. The benefit of this
reactor for Pakistan is that the design allowed it to potentially build nuclear weapons covertly.274
This plant design left large cashes of irradiated fuel that could be reprocessed into weaponsgrade plutonium.275 Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney explain, “[Prime Minister] Bhutto’s
plan… was to use the plutonium from the Candu reactor to make his first atom bombs.”276
However, Pakistan needed a reprocessing plant to recycle the spent fuel rods before they could
develop nuclear weapons. France soon agreed to fill this void and supply the reprocessing
facility that would allow Pakistan to expand its fledgling nuclear program.
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In 1976, Pakistan signed the deal with France to build a reprocessing facility that would
process irradiated nuclear reactor fuel into plutonium suitable for weapons or energy.277 There
were immediate concerns in the international community that Pakistan wished to use the French
plant to create weapons-grade nuclear material. New York Times reporter Jonathan Kandell
explained, “Despite Pakistani assertions that the plutonium extracted from its French plant would
not be used for military purposes, there have been widespread fears that Pakistan would seek to
build a nuclear bomb to counter India’s breakthrough.”278 The fuel produced from the French
process would not be useable for fifteen to twenty years, but the Carter administration saw the
reprocessing as an unnecessary risk.279 The potential of the plant worried President Carter and
was in contrast to his non-proliferation goals.
At the time the original reprocessing deal with France was completed, Pakistan was under
the leadership of Bhutto. When Bhutto came to power in 1971, the country was in disarray after
the civil war in 1971 and Bhutto soon became the dominant political power as the leader the
Pakistan’s People Party. Bhutto played a strong leadership role during the war and he became a
critical force in the rebuilding of Pakistan. When he called for elections amidst mounting
political pressure in 1976, his influence over the people had waned.280 Bhutto was confident that
his countrymen would vote for his party in overwhelming numbers, but the opposition party
managed to gain traction at the last minute and seemed headed to victory the election.281
Bhutto’s party, the Pakistan’s People Party, won the election in 1977 with a remarkable 93% of
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the vote.
Allegations of rigged elections soon abounded since the opposition party strongholds
went suspiciously to the Pakistan’s People Party.282 Opposition party members took to the
streets and began riots that resulted in looting and civilian deaths.283 According to Henry
Kissinger, “Bhutto destroyed himself by seeking a popular mandate too rapidly and then
manipulating the electoral result.”284 The military responded to the mixed election results by
leading a coup d’état’s in March 1977. On July 5, 1977, military officials arrested Bhutto for the
attempted murder of a political opponent, Ajmad Raza Kasuri, and tampering with election
results.285 Another charge against Bhutto was that he was a Muslim in name only, and he did
not have the right to represent a Muslim country.286 The military, under the command of General
Mohammad Zia, committed a bloodless coup in order to stabilize the country and established
martial law.287 The arrest and eventual trial of Bhutto showed the strength of the military in
determining the course of the country.
The Bhutto trial commenced in 1977. During the trial, Bhutto argued that any judgment
would be biased towards a guilty verdict because General Zia and other generals thought that
Bhutto’s obstructed their future plans for an indefinite rule.288 One of the court judges and
General Zia both expressed their belief in a guilty conviction and any evidence Bhutto was

282

"'Sir, the Troops Have Come,’" 35.
Ibid.
284
Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 676.
285
“Pakistan Bans All Political Activity for One Month,” The Washington Post, March 1, 1978,
A16.
286
“Bhutto Appeals His Death Sentence, Saying Judges Were Prejudiced,” New York Times,
March 26, 1978, 2, “Of the Court’s 406-page judgment, the appeal said an implication that Mr.
Bhutto was a Moslem in name only and therefore not fit to be Prime Minister of this Islamic
country was a strong legal reason for reversing the conviction.”
287
William Borders, “Pakistani Faces Biggest Decision,” New York Times, March 25, 1978, 2.
288
Borders, “Pakistani Faces Biggest Decision: Whether Convicted Bhutto Will Die,” 2.
283

64

allowed to submit at trial was in a closed court cession.289 Most of the evidence provided in the
trial was hearsay and would not have been admissible in most Western courts of law.290
Reporter Hugh Trevor-Roper reflects that, “The basic fact is that the army is the sole public force
in Pakistan, and having generally ruled the country, presumes that it has a natural right to
rule.”291 Bhutto’s arrest and trial proved that the military would retain power at any cost and
that all public officials were subject to its whims. The Pakistani court ultimately found him
guilty and sentenced him to death.
Bhutto initially refused to appeal his death sentence on the basis that his appeal would
legitimize a process that he thought was biased from the beginning.292 After a review with his
attorneys, Bhutto decided to file an appeal. Bhutto’s lawyers insisted that countries around the
world, especially the United States, should raise concerns over the ruling. Attorney Yahya
Bakhtiar stated, “the countries that care about human rights-and especially the Americans-should
raise their voices against it.” He declared, “The man never had a fair trial and he must not be
killed.”293 Amnesty International protested the death sentence on humanitarian groups and
condemned the government for its decision that “it saw as the high-handed authoritarianism of
the Zia government.”294 Other countries that protested the decision were Libya and the United
Arab Emirates and as Islamic states, they carried a lot of weight. President Carter reacted with
great concern to Pakistan’s treatment of Bhutto. In line with his policy of encouraging and
engaging in human rights, Carter sent several letters to General Zia and requested clemency for
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the deposed Prime Minister. In his diary, Carter states; “I sent another message to General
[Muhammad] Zia [in Pakistan], asking him on humanitarian grounds to spare the life of [former
president Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto.”295 The president’s request did not move Zia, and Bhutto was
hung a week later.296
Bhutto’s arrest brought about a string of extremist violence to the country. In one
instance, four young men doused themselves with gasoline and burned themselves alive in a
protest against Bhutto’s conviction and impending execution. As the young men died, they
chanted “Free Bhutto now” and vowed that more violence would happen if Bhutto were
executed. 297 The New York Times also reported that, “already there are reports of thousands of
new jailing’s by the Zia regime.”298 Bhutto’s arrest also stunned the Pakistani people because he
was the leader who pulled Pakistan out of its demoralizing defeat over Bangladesh and had
successfully led the country for five and a half years. The idea that he would be put to death
troubled large sections of the population.299 Instability in the region also increased as the
government struggled to maintain control over a radicalized population influenced by the growth
of conservative Islam within the government.300 Islam had always been an important part of life
in Pakistan and influenced the decision to create a separate Muslim country from India, but as
Islam became increasingly radicalized in the late 1970s it was incorporated into the government
of Muslim dominated countries.301
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Zia played an important role with the development and governance of Pakistan during the
Carter administration and was a key figure in Pakistan’s development of the atomic bomb.302 A
journalist described Zia as “a tough professional soldier in the spit-and-polish tradition of the
British-trained Pakistan Army.”303 Zia took his opportunity in the confusion after the election to
take control of the country and enforce martial law. Under military leadership, Zia’s government
drastically changed it from a Western tradition to an ideological regime based on traditional
Muslim beliefs. Rashid explains, “He (Zia) frequently invoked a ‘divine mission’: ‘I have a
mission, given by God, to bring Islamic order to Pakistan,’ he said in 1978. Zia banned politics
and censored the media, while his new Islamic laws victimized non-Muslim minorities and
women.304
A devout Muslim, Zia also increased the presence of Islam in every part of Pakistan’s
government including the inclusion of Islamists in the military and the sponsorship of militant
Islam. Rashid states, “after launching a coup against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mohammad Ziaul
Haq, once an obscure general known for his personal piety, religiosity, and humility, turned into
a ferocious instrument of change for Pakistan.”305 For example, Pakistan sent military supplies
to Afghanistan to help them resist the Soviet invasion in December 1979; and censorship, public
floggings, and torture became more common forms of punishment as the government became
more extreme.306 Zia also used Islam in order to justify the military dictatorship that he created
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and lavished millions of dollars in gifts on his generals, creating a new class of wealthy generals
who increased the power and influence of the military for future generations.307
Pakistan’s complicated history of conflict between an underdeveloped political system
and an overly developed military system, allowed the power of the military apparatus to grow.
Shuja Nawaz reports, "Pakistan's history is one of conflict between an underdeveloped political
system and a well organized army that grew in numbers and political strength as a counter
weight to a hostile India next door in relation to the domestic political system.” Former Army
Chief General Jehangir Karamat claimed: “Whenever there is a breakdown in stability, as has
happened frequently in Pakistan, the military translates its potential into the will to dominate, and
we have military intervention followed by military rule.”308 Pakistan’s military state played an
important role in the development of Pakistan’s atomic bomb as the dominate power in the South
Asian country.
The U.S. reaction to Pakistan during the Carter administration varied from a close
relationship to a slightly hostile one over the nuclear issue. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
explained, “In South Asia, mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan harm the security of
both and heighten the regional danger. We will continue to support their efforts to resolve the
issues dividing them. We seek good relations with both. Our assistance to either one is not
directed at the other.”309 The recognition of these tensions showed that the Carter
Administration had a basic understanding of the roots of the Pakistani atomic program.310
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Zia believed Pakistan’s ability to develop a reprocessing facility was crucial for the
country’s ability to become an atomic power and reacted negatively when the United States
began to pressure France in 1977 to end its contract with Pakistan.311 In September 1977, French
Prime Minister Raymond Barre mentioned to Carter privately the sale of nuclear reprocessing
equipment to Pakistan.312 The United States experienced some success in dissuading France
from completing the contract, and France announced in January 1978 after a visit from President
Carter that it would possibly consider altering Pakistan’s contract.313 Jonathan Kandell reported,
“President Carter, who visited here [France] last week, has been seeking the cooperation of other
Western countries in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the sale to developing
countries of reprocessing equipment that produces fissionable plutonium.”314 For example,
Carter also put pressure on West Germany to end its contract with Brazil, leading to a
considerable cooling of the relations between the United States, West Germany, and Brazil.315
The United States was aware of the strict differences in the danger between a simple
weapons ready device that could only be tested once and a weapons system that could attack
other countries systematically.316 As the Pakistanis ran out of nuclear materials, the United
States knew that they would look to other countries, like China, in order to alleviate the strain or
they would develop other materials that were not up to international standards.317 The Pakistanis
had made a recent discovery of a 150-ton deposit of uranium that could be mined and refined for
weapons grade energy. Pakistan had also approached Niger for uranium since the mining in
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Pakistan would take time and the African nation did not have strong restrictions on its uranium
exports.318
In a letter to the Deputy Secretary of State, the special presidential representative for nonproliferation matters Gerard Smith tried to explain that Pakistan’s development of nuclear
weapons posed one of the greatest international threats since 1945.319 Smith believed that
rewarding Pakistan with military and economic aid would not end Pakistani’s quest for the
atomic bomb, although he believed that an Indian/Pakistani alliance could have the potential to
end the nuclear stand off.320 Smith claimed, “If Pakistan persists, India is bound to develop
nuclear weapons and then where does the process stop.”321
For its nuclear power facility KANUPP, the United States estimated that Pakistan’s
supplies would be exhausted by the summer of 1978 since Canada was no longer supplying the
nuclear fuel. Pakistan had previously relied upon Canada for heavy water, fuel, spare parts, and
emergency repairs for the reactor since the Canadians originally built the reactor. 322 After Indian
detonated its atomic bomb from a plant and material supplied by Canada, the Canadian
government decided that it would end its nuclear cooperation program and generally limit its
own ability to spread nuclear technology.323 Pakistan’s dedication to a nuclear reprocessing
plant only solidified Canada’s decision.324 The United States considered China as a potential
replacement for Canada as the supplier of fuel for the reprocessing facility.325 The Chinese had
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limited experience utilizing heavy water reactors and the facility they built lacked all the
technical achievements of Western nuclear powers. Pakistan’s nuclear power facility was only
the first step in the quest for an atomic devise, but the international community’s decision to
restrict exports of nuclear material limited Pakistan’s ability to expand its nuclear pursuit.
The close relations between France and the United States in regards to the Pakistani issue
meant that American officials learned of France’s decision to suspend its contract before the
Pakistanis.326 U.S. officials met with French officials for a couple of days to discuss the issue of
the reprocessing plant and if France would honor the original contract. The French informed the
United States that it would end the contract for the reprocessing facility on May 29, 1978, before
Pakistan officially was scheduled to receive the news on May 31. Two American goals after
Pakistan received the news were to temper the Pakistani reaction to France and to dissuade them
from trying to develop the nuclear option on their own.327 In keeping with Carter’s foreign
policy, the United States kept the Iranian Shah informed of the decision as well as reassured
India regarding its security concerns.328
The French were upset that U.S. Ambassador Art Hummel informed the Chinese
Ambassador to Pakistan regarding the French decision to end the reprocessing deal before the
Pakistanis were informed.329 The initiative that Hummel took damaged French-Pakistan
relations because the decision was supposed to be confidential and France looked like it bowed
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to pressure from the United States, something the European country was desperate to avoid.330
The French also expressed their belief that the Chinese sided with Pakistan on the security
concerns and supported Pakistan’s quest for an atomic bomb.331 Close relations with France did
allow the United States to influence the cessation of France’s Pakistan deal, although the
decision had unforeseen consequences for the U.S. relations with the European country.
In order to offer an official response, France’s Prime Minister Giscard sent a letter to
Pakistan explaining the reasoning for the cessation of the reprocessing plant and followed this
with a visit by Andre Jacomet, the Secretary of France’s official Council on Foreign Nuclear
Policy.332 The Giscard letter actually held little information on the processing plant and instead
discussed the possibility of changing the processing plant from one “capable of producing pure
weapons-grade plutonium.” The purpose of the facility is the manufacture of the byproduct of
the enriched uranium from the power plants and reprocessing the material into “‘dirty’ plutonium
mixed with uranium that is unsuitable for atomic arms.”333 The implications in the letter were
clear. There would be no more shipments to the plant and the contract was terminated.
Pakistan’s initial opposition to Giscard’s letter was because the Pakistanis were interested in the
development of atomic weapons and not just atomic energy like they claimed. Pakistan
demanded that the French review the decision, reinstate the original contract, and build the plant.
It argued that all international guidelines had been followed to prevent the misuse of the
plutonium, and there was no need cancel the project.334
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The United States wanted an official Pakistani response to the letter in order to make sure
that the understanding of the termination was clear. French representative Jacomet explained
that there would be no official response from France in order to avoid public backlash by the
Gaullist opposition supported by Jacques Chirac.335 The French did not believe an official
response would be necessary in order to inform the United States that all nuclear exports from
France had ceased and they also believed that there would be no more word from Pakistan on the
issue.336 Jacomet believed that the entire situation with Pakistan had resolved itself with minimal
problems and that the United States should move toward the resumption of assistance in order to
increase the probability of moderation.337
The United States did not confirm if it had made any decisions regarding demarches
following the France’s decision to terminate the contract.338 The State Department claimed, “We
are now reviewing our position on resumption of aid and military sales to Pakistan but have not
yet taken any firm decisions. An assurance from the French that the reprocessing deal is
definitely off and that no transfers of equipment, materials or technology have been made since
enactment of the Glenn Amendment (August 4, 1977) would be very useful when we consult
with key members of congress.”339 Regardless of France’s termination of the contract, the
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United States was still nervous about reestablishing aid with Pakistan based upon its history and
the beliefs of congressional members and intelligence reports.340
Since the French reprocessing plant option had been eliminated, the United States
expected Pakistan to research other options including the development of an “indigenous
centrifuge enrichment capability.”341 The threat of an indigenous facility was not immediate
since the Pakistani’s lacked the suppliers and sensitive equipment needed to finish the plant.
However, there was some concern that the Pakistani’s would try to finish the French plant, even
if it they would be a smaller, less efficient, and less sophisticated one.342
In November 1978, the French officially reaffirmed to the United States that its decision
to end the reprocessing plant contract with Pakistan was absolute and there were no plans to
move away from that decision.343 There were still some questions because some French
technicians were still working in Pakistan and the United States wanted them removed. France
assured the United States that the two French technicians still in Pakistan were working only on
civil engineering projects based at the nuclear site, but they did not have access to any sensitive
material.344 Zia wrote a response to French Prime Minister Valery Giscard that he wished to
continue Franco-Pakistani relations and wished to continue their cooperation in other fields. The
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State Department reported, “France still hoped to avoid a confrontation with Pakistan and thus
was continuing to maintain a dialogue with the Pakistani government.”345
Ambassador Hummel relayed to his superiors in Washington his concern that in order to
obstruct Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions they needed to discuss their concerns with India.
However, it would have been detrimental to U.S./Pakistan relations if the information were
leaked to the press that America discussed Pakistan’s security concerns with India.346 At this
point, India did not have any solid information regarding the program, but the United States was
willing to disclose this information but only in a confidential way.347 The problem was that the
information would most likely be funneled back to Pakistan.348
On November 4, 1978, the United States sent a letter to its nuclear allies explaining
Pakistan’s quest for an atomic weapon and its need for gas centrifuges. The goal of this message
was to prevent Pakistan from receiving materials from other countries. It hoped to discourage its
allies from exporting nuclear materials in violation of international nuclear non-proliferation
agreements.349 A State Department memo states, “In addition we are increasingly concerned
about the geopolitical situation in South Asia, as a result of the Afghan Revolution and growing
instability in Iran. We believe it is critical to stability in the region and to our non-proliferation
objectives to inhibit Pakistan from moving closer to the threshold of nuclear explosive
capability.”350 It added, “We are in close touch with following governments on this matter:
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Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The
Netherlands, U.S. and West Germany.” 351 The memorandum concluded, “The U.S. believes that
your government should be in possession of these facts in order that it may exercise vigilance
and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities which would permit
then to develop nuclear explosive capability.” 352 The United States also requested any further
information on the matter that these countries could provide and stated that the United States
would and any exports to countries that sent nuclear materials to Pakistan.353
The United Kingdom also had information that the Pakistanis were in the pursuit of gas
centrifuge and an enrichment facility.354 Ambassador to the United Kingdom Kingman Brewster
stated, “If Pakistan were to succeed in its efforts, we believe a particularly dangerous risk of
nuclear proliferation would arise in Pakistan, with profound implications for the Middle East as
well as the subcontinent.”355 As a close ally to the United States, the United Kingdom discussed
the gas centrifuge situation with American representatives frequently and supported the U.S.
position.
Sweden responded to the American report by stating that it understood the implications
and would follow the U.S. recommendations.356 The United States also determined that the
Swedes were not going to extend their weapon sales especially for inverters. The Swedes were
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reluctant to extend their controls over exports without more information and British support. It
was agreed that communication would be continued.357
The Indian government was aware for some time that Pakistan was bent on achieving
nuclear weapons capability. In the beginning, the Indians did not seem concerned that about
Pakistan’s intention for an atomic weapon. India’s concern only arose when it became apparent
that Pakistan might be within two to three years of becoming an atomic power.358 India also
named an undisclosed country to the United States that was assisting in Pakistani efforts (most
likely China). The ambassador to India reflected that the Indians tended to think the worst of
Pakistan and would enforce their foreign policy as such.359
In Belgium, the Foreign Ministry official “Who was last Ambassador to Peking and
knows Asia from long experience, endorsed our reasons for concern Pakistan. He said he had no
doubt that Bhutto, a demagogue, had set his sights on a nuclear capability for Pakistan. What he
set in motion there was not likely to be scrapped voluntarily.” The Belgium government
reiterated its position on non-proliferation and declared it would not participate in the trade of
nuclear weapons or materials to Pakistan.360
The Austrians had not previously been aware of Pakistan’s efforts to build an atomic
bomb. The United States requested that Austria contact U.S. officials if Pakistan asked to
purchase nuclear materials. Alois Reitbauer, an Austrian official, replied that, “he clearly
understood the dangers of Pakistan becoming a nuclear power, and said ‘we shall do everything
357
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possible to prevent export’ from Austria. He said that he was not aware that the Pakistanis had
made any attempts to get material in Austria, but that he would try to find out and let us
know.”361 Austrian Ambassador Milton Wolf reported, “I concluded by telling Reitbauer that we
are contacting all countries who could supply materials or technology to warn them about the
Pakistani intentions.”362 Reitbauer also questioned if the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) had been informed about the Pakistani situation, and stated that Austria would not
inform it without U.S. confirmation. The ambassador concluded the cable, “Finally (Reitbauer)
said that Austria takes its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty very seriously and said
that we can be assured on the fullest Austrian cooperation in this matter.”363
The information passed to Japan regarding Pakistan received a different reaction than
most Western countries. Due their shared status’ as Asian countries, Japan and Pakistan had
recently had bilateral negotiations and the Pakistani foreign ministry did not mention their
motivations toward becoming a nuclear power. The only other item they discussed was the
reprocessing plant from France, and Pakistan expressed annoyance regarding American
interference. Japan’s Ambassador reported, “Takashima said that GOJ [Government of Japan]
shared U.S. views on dangers of Pakistani moves, although he conveyed his impression that
Pakistan felt particularly threatened by recent events in Afghanistan and instability in
subcontinent.”364
The Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Der Klaauw shared U.S. concerns about

361

“U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,” Department of State, Vienna, November
1978 , NSA, 1, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13j.pdf, (accessed on
December 9, 2011).
362
Ibid.
363
Ibid.
364
“U.S. Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,” Tokyo, November 1978, NSA, 1,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/doc13i.pdf, (accessed on December 9, 2011).
78

proliferation and strongly agreed with the principles of non-proliferation.365 Van Der Klaauw
also believed that former Prime Minister Bhutto had exaggerated regarding Pakistan’s nuclear
proficiency, but stated he was not convinced. He also supported the U.S. position that the
Comprehensive Test Ban was important in controlling Pakistan. The Ambassador reported,
"During his recent visit to India, he said to the Indians that it would be important for them to
adhere to the CTB in the future: the Indians were non-committal in their response and said only
that they would have to study the matter."366 The diplomatic cable went on to state, “Nuclear
technology was still considered the mark of a truly industrialized culture. In addition, it would
help them meet their very real energy needs and they ask why they, the poorer countries, should
be excluded from the benefits of nuclear powers. He said this is a psychological question which
must be addressed by the West."367
As a country with a previous relationship with Pakistan, Canada was largely aware of
Pakistan’s quest to become a nuclear state. Canadian Under-Secretary Klaus Goldschlag,
supported U.S. measures and stated that he was under the impression that Canada had already cut
off any nuclear assistance to Pakistan. He added that any efforts on the part of Pakistan to gain
more assistance would be dismissed. He also asked that any information the United States had
regarding Pakistani attempts to contact Canadian sites be relayed to them immediately.368
Ambassador to West Germany Walter John Stoessel "made the point and repeated it later
that it could do serious damage to West's relations with Pakistan, were news of USG approach to
leak (regarding French relations). Headline 'U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany in nuclear
365
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boycott of Pakistan' was last thing he wanted to see at this juncture in relations with Pakistan and
its neighbors. We heartily concurred."369 Assistant Secretary Laustenschlager stated that the
FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] would take the U.S. "approach fully into account should
there be any attempt by Pakistan to acquire reprocessing technology, or equipment in
FRG."370 He reemphasized West Germany’s 1977 decision to not export sensitive technology
and equipment and it would evaluate any Pakistan request by reviewing the IAEA guidelines and
supplier club rules.371 He also stated that West Germany had more control over the exports of
other nuclear materials and information to other countries, given the stringent requirement for
permits and licenses.
Italy had reports similar to United States assertions regarding Pakistan's development of
the atomic bomb, but had received no request from Pakistan regarding weaponry, technology, or
information.372 Australia received notification in an oral brief by acting Deputy Secretary Roy
Fernandez and reiterated Australia position as a Non-Proliferation Treaty country.373 The
Spanish had heard from the British and agreed with its assessment of the situation and the steps
taken to prevent Pakistan’s acquisition of the atomic bomb.374 Spain was grateful for being
informed but it did not offer any further information.375 Several of the countries contacted did
not have any relevant information to give to the United States regarding the situation and merely
extended support.
369
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The Pakistanis were frustrated by the lack of U.S. support for their position regarding the
reprocessing plant, and Hummel explained that normalizing relations with the United States
would be the first step towards the revival of economic and military aid.376 According to
Congressmen Clement Zablocki from Wisconsin and Senator John Glenn from Ohio, it would be
difficult for Pakistan to receive aid because Congress was still deeply suspicious of Pakistan’s
nuclear intentions.377 According to Brzezinski, in 1978, “American non-proliferation policy was
further strengthened by the Glenn/Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which
called for a cutoff of economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on
dangerous nuclear technology.”378 Pakistan was the first major test to this new foreign policy
and the decision was made to eventually suspend aid in 1979. Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher stated in the memo, “In order to receive aid, Congress and the American people
would insist upon a public declaration that Pakistan would halt its nuclear aspirations.”379
Senator Glenn helped to establish the Glenn Amendment and became the key monitor of
nuclear issues in the Senate. According to the Brzezinski, the Glenn Amendment “…called for a
cutoff of economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on dangerous
nuclear technology.”380 Brzezinski goes on to state, “After it became clear that Pakistan was in
the process of developing a nuclear weapons capability, we implemented the requirements of the
Glenn amendment and quietly terminated aid. Realizing that the amount of this assistance was
too small to give us real leverage, we tried to orchestrate a diplomatic campaign against
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Pakistan’s nuclear policy.”381 Pakistan did not directly violate the Glenn Amendment since
there was no active nuclear weapons facility to inspect, but the U.S. government still utilized the
Amendment in order to try and limit Pakistan’s ambitions.
Under Secretary of State David Newsom and Pakistan’s Secretary General for Foreign
Affairs, Agha Shahi, discussed the possibility of the United States resuming aid to Pakistan in
August 1978.382 However, there were several political problems with resuming aid, especially
with the unresolved reprocessing issue.383 In the meeting, Shahi claimed that Pakistan was
surprised by Ambassador Hummel’s departure from the conventional standards and felt that
United States was going beyond the Glenn Amendment by making demands that no country
would accept. Shahi stated that he would report Newsom’s remarks to General Zia and added
that Pakistan would not inform the United States of any disruption in the status of the
reprocessing plant.
Shahi went on to chastise the United States for not assisting Pakistan like the rest of the
world. Christopher revealed, “Shahi asserted that the U.S. alone among creditor nations had been
quote ‘odd man out’ unquote. It was pointed out to Shahi that our decision on debt rescheduling
was made on economic grounds and was related to Pakistan’s unexpectedly high level of
remittances.”384 Newsom explained that the United States was not trying to penalize Pakistan or
force it to admit shortcomings, but it was trying to find a way to normalize relations.385 Pakistan
not only had to deal with the legal restrictions of the Glenn Amendment, but also a skeptical
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political climate in Congress. The legal reality was the Glenn Amendment that referred to the
transfer of reprocessing technology and equipment to a country from outside the already
established nuclear nations. Christopher reported, “The Glenn amendment would be triggered by
such transfers to Pakistan and it was in anticipation of the Glenn amendment being activated that
certain decisions were taken in Washington last year.”386
The Carter administration’s suspension of economic and military assistance to Pakistan
was an “effort to persuade Islamabad to cancel plans to purchase the plant” and the U.S. stated
that it would not begin the process of renewing aid until the reprocessing situation had been
resolved.387 At this time, the U.S. government had no interest in publicizing Pakistan’s
reprocessing situation or the growth of the Glenn amendment to cover more proliferation. Vance
recalls, “Shahi stated flatly and repeatedly that no government of Pakistan could give even a
private assurance not to engage in reprocessing and still survive in the face of public opinion.
Unfortunately, if the United States could not offer aid and the extension of aid did not achieve
the expected result, it had no leverage with Pakistan.”
By late 1978, the United States informed the International Atomic Energy Agency of the
developments and diplomatic exchanges with Pakistan regarding the atomic bomb. IAEA
officials were shocked by the extent of Pakistan’s ambitions. The IAEA director, Sigvard
Eklund, had signed a letter to Pakistan stating that the IAEA had to be informed of the design,
construction and/or operation of any reprocessing plant.388 When the French visited Pakistan in
1978 to check on the progress of civil structures under the original contract that were not nuclear
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related, the Pakistanis denied them access to certain parts of the plant, and they saw laboratories
that were equipped with heavy shielding for plutonium oxide. There was also information that
Pakistan attempted to contact a German weapons producers in order to get more processing
equipment.389 The IAEA grew increasingly concerned about the information coming from
Pakistan.390
The IAEA sent several questions to Pakistan. In response, Pakistan claimed that they did
not need inspections because there was no facility that required safeguards. In the IAEA
briefing, “In musing over the seriousness of the situation and the limited tolerance of the world
to accept such developments, Eklund wondered whether public disclosure would not be
appropriate at some point. Smith indicated that it might be effective in the future but for now he
reminded Eklund of the sensitivity and care with which we must continue to deal with the
issue.”391 Eklund believed that a nuclear free South Asian zone suggested by Ambassador Smith
would not be feasible because China’s and India’s attitudes and the atomic weapons they held.392
Eklund’s conclusion was that the information on Pakistan should announced to the rest of
the world so responsible parties could put pressures on Pakistan in order to limit its goals.393 In
telegram regarding the conversation between Ambassador Smith and Dr. Eklund, “Ambassador
Smith noted that he felt we still had some time, as he doubted the Pakistanis would be able to
explode a device for two to three years.” 394 Eklund stated that the more time Pakistan had to
work on a weapon design the harder it would be to stop their efforts, and Eklund wanted to
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support whatever decision the United States made. The telegram went on to state, “Eklund was
clearly shocked and upset by this information. He sees a Pakistan explosive capability as a
serious threat to nuclear power programs of the future.” When the United States finally included
the IAEA in its feelings regarding Pakistan, the United States had full international support.
Pakistan’s quest for an atomic weapon sent the international community scrambling to try
and contain the South Asian country. For most of 1978, the United States moved to force the
cancellation of France’s deal with Pakistan and then sent a letter to all of the United States
nuclear allies to try and stop any exporting of nuclear material. The United States also
terminated any aid to Pakistan. However, despite its efforts the Carter administration had little
success in stopping Pakistan’s nuclear program.
The developments of the 1970s showed the international community that Jimmy Carter
talked tough on nuclear proliferation, but if the country benefited the United States then nuclear
ambitions could be overlooked. The coup d’état committed by Muhammad Zia further
destabilized Pakistan and increased U.S. concerns with Pakistan’s attempt to acquire an atomic
weapon. The reprocessing deal with France further increased tensions in the international
community as the United States tried to influence its allies to avoid the sale of any nuclear
materials to Pakistan. Carter did succeed in slowing down Pakistan’s quest for an atomic
weapon, but he not succeed in dissuading Pakistan from its nuclear ambitions.

85

Conclusion
After decades of resisting international pressure, Pakistan rejoiced on May 28, 1998 as it
successfully tested its first atomic device.395 A country that spent most of its recent history as a
colony of the British Empire entered the nuclear age.

The United States and the international

community saw the test as a demonstration of years of failed policies towards limiting the
inevitable. Pakistan had become the first Muslim country with an atomic weapon in its military
arsenal.396 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter attempted to halt Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, but
his efforts had only a limited effect and were unrealistic given Pakistan’s religious motivations.
Pakistan’s enthusiasm for the project was not solely based on increasing military prowess or the
country’s prestige around the world, but it was to acquire a nuclear weapon for the Muslim
faith.397 While the financial pressures on Pakistan did have some success in limiting the speed of
growth, Carter failed to fully understand the determination of the Pakistani government to
acquire an atomic weapon and thus failed in his quest to end the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
Throughout 1978, the United States continued to hold diplomatic discussions with
Pakistan, but problems developed as crises in the Middle East and South Asia escalated. In an
attempt to halt the development of atomic weapons, in 1979 the United States decided to suspend
aid again in hopes of changing Pakistan’s course. In a letter to French President Giscard and
other international leaders, Carter stated, “I am very concerned about the mounting evidence that
the Pakistani nuclear program is aimed at developing a nuclear weapons option. There is very
good evidence that the Pakistanis have a well-financed, highly secret program to build a gas
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centrifuge enrichment plant, and that they are continuing efforts at the reprocessing capability as
well.”398 After a brief suspension, Pakistani President Zia successfully lobbied the United States
for the resumption of aid in early 1980. The situation with Afghanistan specifically moved the
United States towards rebuilding its relationship with Pakistan since the Soviet Union became
the greater enemy.399 In late 1979, Carter attempted to mend relations and offered Zia $400
million dollars in aid. Zia turned down Carter’s aid package and called the deal “peanuts” to the
international community.400 President Ronald Reagan later offered Pakistan a larger deal of $3.2
billion and forty F-16 fighters.401 This increase in the deal largely came from the U.S. reliance
on Pakistan to support the Afghanistan rebellion against the Soviet invasion and Reagan’s more
aggressive approach to foreign policy.402 The deal was not an incentive for Pakistan to stop its
atomic program nor did the deal request that it halt its nuclear program. The fear of Soviet
aggression outweighed any threat of a nuclear Pakistan, and it continued to work towards an
atomic weapon.
General Zia continued work on a nuclear devise until his death in 1988 and put control
over the program exclusively under the military.403 Scott Sagan explains, “It is therefore not
surprising that common military biases can be seen to have influenced Pakistani crisis behavior,
its development of its nuclear arsenal, and the doctrine that guides the potential use of nuclear
weapons in war." Sagan continues, "the Pakistani military has maintained virtually complete and
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independent control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, shunning the input of civilian leaders.”404
After Zia’s death in 1988, the next elected civilian leader Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former
prime minister, received the first brief on Pakistan’s atomic weapons programs from the United
States and not from the military.405 There has not been an official confirmation on when
Pakistan finally completed its first atomic weapon, but it was largely rumored that Pakistan had
completed the weapon several years before the test.406
The quest for a Pakistani nuclear weapon was an important factor in Carter’s desire to
limit the proliferation of atomic weapons, but Carter’s inconsistent dealings with Pakistan by
trying to utilize economic aid and sanctions limited its effectiveness. The reprocessing plant deal
between France and Pakistan caused international tension and the United States used the
situation to justify the suspension of aid to Pakistan in 1977 and again in 1979, but the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan changed the situation.407 Curbing Soviet aggression became a top
priority and as the neighbor to Afghanistan, Pakistan became the primary means for funneling
supplies into the embattled country.408 Carter campaigned on the promise of human rights and
ending nuclear proliferation around the world; however, his resumption of aid to Pakistan proves
that the policy ideas were short lived and that the Cold War conflict truly drove American
foreign policy.
Carter also failed to fully account for the religious motivations in Pakistan’s quest for an
atomic device. Pakistani leaders Bhutto and Zia both made aggressive proclamations regarding
an atomic bomb for Pakistan and thus the Islamic world. He famously stated that Pakistan would
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“eat grass” before it would give up its atomic dreams.409 Bhutto also proclaimed that if all other
religious groups had an atomic weapon the Muslim world should as well.410 While the growth of
extreme Islam was relatively new to Carter and his administration, the words of Pakistan’s
leaders showed that their quest for atomic weapons would come at the cost of the people.411
Thus making Carter’s non-proliferation initiative and economic restrictions on Pakistan mostly
useless.
As Carter had to change his policy in order to respond to aggressive Soviet actions,
Carter’s national security team became fractured. His spokes-in-the-wheels approach
deteriorated as his top two top foreign policy advisors began to fight for time with him.
Eventually, Vance left the White House after increasing tensions regarding moral differences
with Brzezinski and the president regarding the Iranian Hostage crisis.412 The administration
held a crucial meeting while Vance was on vacation, effectively minimalizing him from
significant policy decisions and directly led to his decision to resign from the Department of
State.413 The resignation of Vance sounded the alarm of a disjointed administration and led to
questions about Carter’s ability to be re-elected in 1980.414
Carter’s belief in ending proliferation helped guide many of his policies, but the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan changed the course of his administration.415 To the American people,
limiting the expansion of atomic weapons no longer seemed like a viable option.416 Soon Carter
began actively expanding the military, something strictly contradictory to his previous campaign
409
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promises and administration’s policies. The growth of the armed forces continued into the
Reagan administration, along with U.S. military aid to Pakistan for its covert support of the
Afghan Mujahedeen.417
President Jimmy Carter had attempted to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons around
the world, but on his watch Pakistan set course towards what he desperately wanted to stop. Most
likely there was nothing that could be done to stop Pakistan’s from obtaining nuclear technology
and materials, but Carter failed to dissuade the country from even considering a change in its
program. Any other course of action taken by Carter towards Pakistan could have been
disastrous, particularly a military intervention; so, the administration had limited options.
However, had Carter been willing to stay the course on his policies it could have set a precedent
for policy in the future. Carter showed Pakistan that as long as the country served a purpose to
the United States, it would get a slide on sensitive issues and set the foundation for diplomatic
relations.
Carter began his presidency with a variety of hopes and aspirations that were soon dashed
by an unstable world. He wished to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but he failed to
move Pakistan towards the nuclear free world that he envisioned. As the Middle East situation
grew grimmer between in 1979 and 1980, Carter lost any leverage he had in dissuading Pakistan
from developing atomic weapons. A nuclear free world is a wonderful vision, but the reality of
ancient rivalries and underdog ambitions limited his ability to manipulate a determined Pakistan.
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